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ARTICLES

IS IT BAD LAW TO BELIEVE A POLITICIAN?
CAMPAIGN SPEECH AND DISCRIMINATORY INTENT

*

Shawn E. Fields

"Candidatessay many things on the campaign trail; they are often contradictory or inflammatory. No shortage of dark purpose
can be found by sifting through the daily promises of a drowning
candidate, when in truth the poor shlub's only intention is to get
elected."'
2
"If you ever injected truth into politics you have no politics."

INTRODUCTION

Politicians lie. For better or worse, we have grown accustomed
to this unsavory practice. We expect candidates for public office to
make promises they have no intention of keeping. We expect candidates to say one thing to "play to the base" during primaries,
only to contradict themselves as they "play to the middle" in the
general election. 3 But should this unfortunate fact of political discourse influence judicial analysis of a politician's potentially unconstitutional motivations behind a challenged government action? Should courts refuse even to consider discriminatory and
* Professor of Legal Writing, University of San Diego School of Law; Professor of Political Science, Point Loma Nazarene University. I would like to thank my research assistant, Gwenllian Kern-Allely, for her invaluable contributions to this article.
1. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
2. Will Rogers, Will Rogers on Politics, WILL ROGERS TODAY, http://www.willrogers
today.com/willrogers-quotes/quotes.cfm?91D=4 (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
3. See Marina Agranov, Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility, and the Selection of Candidates, 8 AM. ECON. J. 61, 67-72 (2016).
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inflammatory campaign pledges in assessing the purpose of a
statute or regulation simply because we distrust our elected officials? Can such a bright-line evidentiary exclusion be justified
even when a political candidate speaks openly, consistently, and
convincingly about his desire to enact impermissibly discriminatory policies if elected? 4
Courts across the country are currently facing these questions
as they consider whether and to what extent then-candidate Donald Trump's incendiary comments about Muslims suggest that
President Trump's executive orders on immigration were motivated by impermissible religious animus.5 As with discriminatory
intent case law generally, courts have applied inconsistent and
contradictory evidentiary frameworks to evaluate President
Trump's campaign statements. 6 Lacking a coherent judicial doctrine to govern them, courts are left to advance conflicting policy
rationales for how the campaign statements of a private citizen
ought to or ought not to be considered as evidence of official government discriminatory intent.7
Surprisingly little has been written about the proper role of
campaign rhetoric in the subjective motive analyses of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.8 This article seeks to fill that gap

4. Matthew Segal, President Trump's Campaign Promises Stick With Us-They
Should Stick With Him, Too, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 25, 2017, 9:02 AM), https://www.justse
curity.org/39246/president-trumps-campaign-promises-stick-us-they-stick-him/ ("Given the
Trump Administration's many anti-Muslim statements, it's hard to imagine how the ban
could be upheld by any court that gives serious weight to that evidence.").
5. Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S.
, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); Int'l
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 2017); Washington v. Trump,
No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017).
6. See Int'l Refugee, 857 F.3d at 598-99 ("[The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit] decline[s] to impose a bright-line rule against considering campaign statements,
because as with any evidence, [the court] must make an individualized determination as
to a statement's relevancy and probative value in light of all the circumstances."); Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1174 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Even if a politician's past
statements were utterly clear and consistent, using them to yield a specific constitutional
violation would suggest an absurd result-namely, that the policies of an elected official
can be forever held hostage by the unguarded declarations of a candidate."); Hawaii v.
Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 761 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting the findings of the lower court that "the
historical record . . . contained 'significant and unrebutted evidence of religious animus
driving the promulgation of the Executive Order,"' but declining to discuss whether such
pre-election campaign evidence should be considered, instead affirming the lower court's
injunction on statutory grounds).
7. See supranote 6.
8. Cf. Michael A. Collata, The Role of CircumstantialEvidence in Proving Discriminatory Intent: Developments Since Washington v. Davis, 19 B.C.L. REV. 795, 800-01 (1978)
(exploring use of circumstantial evidence generally to determine discriminatory intent,
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by addressing the competing policy rationales currently articulated across the country. In doing so, this article will consider the
spectrum of opinions offered in connection with the ubiquitous
travel ban litigations. 9 On one end of the spectrum, conservative
Ninth Circuit judges Jay Bybee and Alex Kozinski have eschewed
precedent to suggest that review of the constitutionality of any
government action should be limited to the four corners of the
document and that judges should refrain from peeking "behind
the curtain" of the official action to divine intent. 10 On the other
end of the spectrum, a majority of judges in the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals have intimated that all sorts of extra-official evidence can form the "relevant context" for discriminatory intent
purposes, including campaign statements." This expansive position begs the question: "Does the relevant context include everything the Trump Administration has said?"1 2 This article will also
address the misguided but increasingly proffered claim by Jeffrey
Toobin and others that a government action "is either constitutional or it's not" regardless of the intent behind the action. 13

which may include campaign speech); Thomas B. Henson, Note, Proving Discriminatory
Intent from a Facially Neutral Decision with a DisproportionateImpact, 36 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 109, 112 (1979) (critiquing specific intent requirement and narrow categories of
evidence available to prove specific intent); Sofia D. Martos, Coded Codes: Discriminatory
Intent, Modern Political Mobilization, and Local Immigration Ordinances, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 2099, 2100-04 (2010) (asserting role for more rigorous application of the Davis and
Arlington Heights six-factor test to extra-official communications to detect discriminatory
intent, but not addressing campaign speech specifically).
9. See, e.g., Int'l Refugee, 857 F.3d at 594 ("Then-candidate Trump's campaign
statements reveal that on numerous occasions, he expressed anti-Muslim sentiment, as
well as his intent, if elected, to ban Muslims from the United States."); see David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 Nw. L. REV. 583,
585 n.6 (2017) (listing the growing number of litigations and declaring that "[t]he litigation over President Trump's executive order is sprawling").

10. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1183 (Bybee, J., dissenting) ("[I]f we have questions about the basis for the President's ultimate findings," courts cannot "peek behind the
curtain," even if it is to determine whether the Executive Order is a '"Muslim ban' or
something else.").
11. Int'l Refugee, 857 F.3d at 598-99 ("[T]he Government argues that even if we could
consider unofficial acts and statements, we should not rely on campaign statements....
But we decline to impose a bright-line rule against considering campaign statements, because as with any evidence, we must make an individualized determination as to a statement's relevancy and probative value in light of all the circumstances.").
12. Segal, supra note 4.
13. Jeffrey Toobin, The Courts and President Trump's Words, NEW YORKER (Mar. 17,
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-courts-and-president-trumps2017),
words ("The Muslim ban is either constitutional or it's not-and Donald Trump's words on
the campaign trail don't settle that question one way or the other.").
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Ultimately, this article asserts that any bright-line rules rejecting consideration of campaign statements or other extra-official
evidence cannot be justified as a matter of law or logic. Instead,
the inquiry over whether and how to consider campaign statements in the discriminatory intent analysis ought to be factspecific, flexible, and guided by traditional notions of evidence,
with an emphasis on evidentiary weight over evidentiary admissibility.
This article proceeds in three parts. First, it outlines the contours of discriminatory intent analysis in the First and Fourteenth Amendment contexts, beginning with Washington v. Davis
and continuing through the travel ban litigations. This background highlights the consistent reluctance of courts to consider
extrinsic evidence of discriminatory intent even in the most egregious circumstances. Second, this article examines the "peculiar"
case of campaign speech as a form of extrinsic evidence of discriminatory intent and systematically refutes the five major arguments advanced in favor of a per se ban on consideration of
campaign speech.1 4 In short, these arguments all articulate concerns over the evidentiary reliability of such statements, concerns
which can and should be handled by courts discounting the
weight of such evidence where necessary, not by blindly refusing
to admit the evidence at all. Third, this article reflects on objective considerations that may assist courts in assessing the probative value of campaign speech, including the size of the decisionmaking body, the nature of the constitutional claim, and any special deference or separation of powers concerns implicated by
immigration or foreign policy actions. While these factors will
likely always be relevant in the context of a discriminatory intent
analysis, their application to campaign speech specifically can
help bring clarity to a confused area of constitutional jurisprudence.
This article concludes with an observation that a restrictive,
bright-line rule preventing the admissibility of campaign statements neither adheres to the letter nor spirit of Washington v.
Davis and its progeny, nor provides the "manageable, sensible"
solution its proponents claim. 15 Moreover, this artificial barrier

14. See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1173-74 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
15. See id. at 1174 ("Limiting the evidentiary universe to activities undertaken while
crafting an official policy makes for a manageable, sensible inquiry.").
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ignores the paramount importance of uncovering discriminatory
government animus and the near-insurmountable hurdles already facing plaintiffs charged with proving animus. By retaining
flexibility to consider the probative value of campaign statements
on a case-by-case basis, courts can protect the traditional role of
the fact-finder, preserve the viability of constitutional civil liberties cases, and hold politicians to account for the promises and
pledges on which their voters rely.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT ANALYSIS
Under well-settled United States Supreme Court precedent,
the constitutionality of a given action often depends on the government's motive; the same exact action can be constitutional or
unconstitutional depending on the reason why the government is
doing what it is doing. 16 But this centrality of discriminatory motive to First and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional challenges occurred during the seismic jurisprudential shift from the
Warren era to the Burger Court era, and the Court's attempts to
refine discriminatory intent analysis since that time have been at
times halting, contradictory, and "confused."17
A defining characteristic of the Warren Court of the 1950s and
1960s was its sympathetic view towards civil rights litigation, including its expansive approach to challenges to state action pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause.1 8 Indicative of this sympathy was the Warren Court's willingness to strike down facially
neutral government regulations as unconstitutional if those regulations had a sufficiently discriminatory impact on a discrete ra-

16. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 n.14 (2005) ("One consequence of
taking account of the purpose underlying past actions is that the same government action
may be constitutional if taken in the first instance and unconstitutional if it has a sectarian heritage.").
17. Vikram D. Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, The Complexities of a "Motive"Analysis in
Challenging President Trump's Executive Order Regarding Entry to the United States,
VERDICT (Mar. 24, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/03/24/complexities-motive-analy
("Considsis -challenging-president-trumps-executive-order-regarding-entry-united-states
eration of direct evidence of impermissible subjective motive has been a confused area of
constitutional law.").
18. Gregory Dickinson, One Justice, Two Justice, Red Justice, Blue Justice: Dissecting
the Role of Political Ideology in Supreme Court Nominations, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 345, 354
(2017) ("Today, the Warren Court is known for its liberal majority that expanded civil
rights, civil liberties, and judicial power. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Court
handed down many well-known civil-rights decisions.").
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cial group or other protected class. 19 This impact approach rested
on objective empirical evidence and sidestepped the thorny issue
of divining a legislative body's intent behind an action. 20
In contrast, the Burger Court of the 1970s was defined as much
by its reactionary curtailment of Warren Court era civil rights
protection as by any affirmative jurisprudential mark left during
the decade. 21 This philosophically more restrictive view of equal
protection expressed itself most notably in the 1976 case Washington v. Davis, which held that courts may not invalidate facially
neutral statutes solely because of their discriminatory effect. 22 Instead, courts can invalidate a government action as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause only if the action was motivated by
an intention to discriminate against a protected group. 2 3 While
Davis and its progeny confirmed that objective impact analysis
remained relevant, the primary evidentiary concern of courts
faced with an Equal Protection Clause challenge would be the

19. See Jim Chen, Come Back to the Nickel and Five: Tracing the Warren Court's Pursuit of Equal Justice Under Law, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1203, 1222-23 (2002) (describing the civil rights legacy of the Warren Court, including the willingness to consider disparate impact of facially neutral legislation); Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist
Court, 66 TuL. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1992) (discussing the Warren Court's introduction of
the concept that "racially disparate effects (disparate impact)-use of a device that is facially neutral but has a disproportionate adverse effect on minorities-might reflect unlawful racial discrimination").
20. Paradoxically, the Warren Court also refused to consider evidence of discriminatory motive in circumstances where the disparate impact was nevertheless constitutionally
warranted. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370, 372, 383 (1968) (The Court
held that criminalizing the practice of burning draft cards was constitutional because the
cards were needed to administer the draft, and rejected the argument that the intent of
the law was to suppress the ideas that the burning of draft cards communicated: "It is a
familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.").
21. Indeed, the 1968 presidential election featured Richard Nixon running "against
the liberal Warren Court almost as much as his actual opponent." THOMAS M. KECK, THE
MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 4 (Univ. Chicago Press 2004). "When he real-

ized Nixon would be president, Chief Justice Warren immediately announced his retirement in an attempt to allow the lame duck President Lyndon Johnson to replace him."
Dickinson, supra note 18, at 355; see Chen, supra note 19, at 1263 ("The Burger Court
proved to be the last battleground on which Earl Warren and Richard Nixon played out
their heated rivalry.").
22. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.
Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to
the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations." (citation
omitted)).
23. Id. at 239-40, 244-45.
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subjective motivations of the lawmakers enacting the regulation. 24
This article does not seek to relitigate the wisdom or propriety
of the Court's move away from impact and towards intent. That
path has been well-worn by scholars for four decades. 25 Instead, it
seeks to briefly sketch the outline of discriminatory intent analysis since Davis to provide context for the debate over whether a
politician's campaign statements should factor into this analysis.
In doing so, one incontrovertible truth should become clear: divining the subjective motivations behind an action is a much more
complicated and problematic endeavor than assessing the objective impact of that action. This fact predictably has persuaded
courts to strictly limit the types of evidence they will consider and
to refuse to weigh evidence they deem sufficiently unreliable, including campaign statements. 26 As this section asserts, however,
this approach is logically unjustified and legally inconsistent with
the intent of Davis and its progeny.
First, this part highlights the analytical framework of intent
analysis in Fourteenth Amendment race-based challenges articulated in Davis, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous28
ing Development Corp.,27 and PersonnelAdministrator v. Feeney.
Second, it summarizes how this facially broad framework has
been limited by lower courts. Third, it explores how this Fourteenth Amendment intent analysis has informed First Amendment religious discrimination cases, which have significant substantive overlap with race-based challenges and which have
direct relevance to the cases percolating through the courts considering whether and how to analyze the impact of then24. See id. at 243; Martos, supra note 8, at 2103; Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate
Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 728, 725-32 (2006) (noting changing nature of Equal Protection Clause claims after Davis).
25. See, e.g., Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the
Impact and Originsof "The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection," 40 CoNN. L. REV. 931, 94448, 952-55 (2008) (summarizing the development of post-Davis scholarship in disparate
impact versus discriminatory intent judicial analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment);
Ian F. Haney Ldpez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 989, 995 n.31 (2007) (challenging the trend towards
"colorblindness" in judicial review post-Davis); Selmi, supra note 24, at 705 (defending discriminatory intent analysis).
26. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 623-24 n.52 (2006) (declining to "defern[ to comments made by [government] officials to the media" when determining discriminatory intent because such extraofflcial statements are inherently unreliable).
27. 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
28. 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
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candidate Trump's statements on the constitutionality of President Trump's actions.
A. The Birth of DiscriminatoryIntent Analysis: Davis, Arlington
Heights, and Feeney
In Davis, the Court held that discriminatory impact alone was
insufficient to prove the existence of impermissible racial classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 29 The Court found that such an equal protection
challenge could withstand judicial scrutiny only if the movant
could demonstrate that the intent behind the governmental action was to discriminate on the basis of race. 30 "That is, a factual
finding that a statute imposes a disproportionate burden on a
particular racial group is not sufficient to invalidate that statute
absent some other indication of a discriminatory purpose for enactment." 31
In Davis, the plaintiffs alleged that a test for a position as a
police officer in the District of Columbia violated the Equal Protection Clause because a higher percentage of blacks than whites
failed the test.3 2 In rejecting this previously recognized discriminatory impact argument, the Court found that evidence of a correlation between an action and a disproportionately negative effect on a protected class, standing alone, was insufficient to
trigger strict scrutiny. 33 Instead, the Court explained that strict
scrutiny of a challenged action under the Equal Protection Clause
would be triggered only when a plaintiff provided sufficient evi-

29. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
30. Id. ("Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from
the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more
heavily on one race than another... . Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral
on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of the government to pursue, is
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.').
31. Julia Kobick, DiscriminatoryIntent Reconsidered: Folk Concepts of Intentionality
and Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517, 521-22 (2010)
("When plaintiffs challenging a government action or statute cannot prove that it was
purposefully discriminatory toward the race in question, courts will uphold the action if it
is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. This deferential standard of review works as a presumption of validity of the government action.").
32. Davis, 426 U.S. at 232, 235; see also Kobick, supranote 31, at 522 (noting that the
plaintiffs alleged "the test had not been validated as predictive of future job performance"
but did not allege "that the test was intentionally discriminatory").
33. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
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dence that the intent of the facially neutral action was to discriminate on the basis of race. 34 While the Court affirmed that the objective "[disproportionate impact is not irrelevant," it remained
relevant only as a factor in the analysis of whether a subjective
discriminatory purpose existed. 35 By considering the "totality of
the relevant facts," including disproportionate impact, courts
might be able to infer discriminatory intent. 36 However, the Court
neither expanded on how litigants could prove discriminatory
purpose nor what factors it would consider in this "totality of the
relevant facts" test.3 7

The Court addressed this ambiguity one year later in Arlington
Heights, when it both established a framework for judicial evaluations of discriminatory intent claims and articulated a six-factor
test to guide its analysis. 38 In Arlington Heights, the plaintiffs
challenged a municipality's rejection of a petition for rezoning in
a wealthy, predominantly white Chicago suburb which would
have cleared the way for a low- and moderate-income housing development affirmatively advertised to racial minorities in an attempt at racial integration. 39 The plaintiffs provided evidence
that the government's rejection adversely affected racial minorities and further suggested, pursuant to Davis, that the action was
motivated by animus toward these minorities. 40
In determining how to consider the plaintiffs' evidence of discriminatory intent, the Court established the analytical framework for judicial evaluations of such evidence that continues to
govern intent analysis. First, courts are to look to any direct evidence of discriminatory purpose and intent, such as an open discussion in the legislative history that the law was intended to disfavor a racial group.4 1 Where direct evidence is unavailable, as it
often is and as it was in Arlington Heights, courts are to make "a

34. Id. at 240, 242.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68
(1977).
39. See id. at 257.
40. Id. at 263-65, 269.
41. Id. at 266 ("Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,
emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears
neutral on its face. The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases are rare." (citations omitted)).
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sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of
intent as may be available" and look at the totality of the relevant
evidence to determine "whether invidious discriminatory purpose
was a motivating factor" for the decision. 42
To guide this sensitive inquiry, the Court adopted a six-factor
test to evaluate evidence of such intent: (1) the discriminatory effect of the official action, (2) the historical background of the decision, (3) the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision, (4) departure from the normal procedural
sequence, (5) departure from the normal substantive standard,
and (6) legislative or administrative history of the decision. 43 The
Court ultimately rejected the equal protection challenge, finding
that, although the official action had a discriminatory effect on
racial minorities, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the presence
of a discriminatory intent because there existed no departure
from the normal municipal process nor any historical or legislative evidence of racial animus. 44
A natural question left unresolved by Arlington Heights was
whether and to what extent a decision maker's ability to foresee
that a particular action would disproportionately harm minorities
could serve as circumstantial evidence of animus. After all, any
reasonable official could have foreseen that the rejection of a zoning ordinance designed specifically to increase minority residential presence in an affluent and desirable suburb would naturally
have a discriminatory effect on those minorities.
The Court answered that question in Feeney, holding that even
if a disparate impact was foreseeable, the constitutional standard
for discriminatory intent requires proof that decision makers acted because of this impact, not merely in spite of it.45 In Feeney, the

42. See id. at 266-68.
43. Id. at 267-68 ('The foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to be exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in determining whether racially discriminatory intent
existed.").
44. Id. at 269-70. While the Court acknowledged that the "impact of the Village's decision does arguably bear more heavily on racial minorities .. . [tihe statements by the
Plan Commission and Village Board members, as reflected in the official minutes, focused
almost exclusively on the zoning aspects of the MHDC petition." Id.
45. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ("Discriminatory purpose ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that
the decisionmaker . .. selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." (citation omitted)).
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plaintiffs alleged that a Massachusetts statute requiring the applications of veterans who qualified for civil service jobs to be considered ahead of all other applications amounted to unconstitutional gender discrimination because the statute operated
"overwhelmingly to the advantage of males." 4 6 Indeed, Justice
Stewart acknowledged in his majority opinion that it would be
"disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences of this legislation for women were unintended, in the sense that they were
47
not volitional or in the sense that they were not foreseeable."
Notwithstanding this acknowledgement, the Court found that
generalized intent was insufficient proof of discriminatory purpose, which implied "more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences." 4 8 Instead, the Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause required a more specific intent where
the government "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." 4 9
This more subjective inquiry into the specific intent of a legislature imposes a significantly more demanding burden of proof on
50
plaintiffs than the more objective Arlington Heights test. Under
Arlington Heights, the presence of evidence satisfying each of the
six factors presumably would have been sufficient to demonstrate
discriminatory intent and to trigger strict scrutiny. After Feeney,
however, a litigant not only must present evidence to satisfy
these factors, but must also convince the court that this evidence
existed because government officials wanted to discriminate
against a protected class.51
The practical effect of Feeney has been two-fold. First, in the
absence of further guidance regarding how a litigant can prove

46. Id. at 259.
47. Id. at 278.
48. Id. at 279.
49. Id.
50. Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TuL. L. REV. 1065, 1085 (1998); Kobick,
supra note 31, at 527-28.
51. See Kobick, supranote 31, at 528 ("Feeney at once left the door open for an inquiry
into whether the foreseeability of harm supports an inference of intent and confirmed that
foreseeability of harm is not sufficient evidence to find intent to harm.... While the Court
suggested that evidence of foreseeability can support a 'strong inference' of intent, the
Court's dicta did not equate foreseeability with the other Arlington Heights factors, and it
did not clarify the appropriate role for foreseeability in the context of the totality of the
circumstances test.").
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discriminatory intent, courts have largely limited their evaluation
of the evidence to official governmental records and refused to
consider "unofficial" or "extra-official" evidence of animus. 52 Second, as a result of the heightened Feeney subjective intent standard and courts' restriction of the Arlington Heights factors to official records, few equal protection challenges survive judicial
scrutiny. 53
B. DiscriminatoryIntent Analysis After Feeney
The ambiguity of Davis and its progeny has left "[c]onsideration of direct evidence of impermissible subjective motive ...
a
confused area of constitutional law." 5 4 Faced with this lack of analytical clarity and the inherently difficult task of divining an individual's personal motivations, let alone the motivations of a large
legislative body, courts have "often expressed .

.

. a reluctance to

use extrinsic proof of invidious motive to strike down laws that
would otherwise pass constitutional muster."5 5 The current evidentiary inquiry posed by most courts narrowly relies on official
governmental records, which rarely contain evidence of discriminatory animus, and ignores other "unofficial" historical evidence.
As a result, equal protection challenges rarely succeed.
Two important post-Feeney equal protection cases illustrate
this narrow evidentiary approach. In City of Memphis v. Greene,
black residents challenged the local government's decision to
close a city street, claiming that the closure was a discriminatory
attempt to separate the city racially in a way that benefitted the
52. Foster, supra note 50, at 1085 ("Though the Court in Feeney set out to define the
meaning of discriminatory purpose . . . adherence to the Feeney conception of intent has
been selective. In some cases, the Feeney standard is explicitly invoked and relied upon by
the Court. In other cases, this narrow conception of intent is virtually ignored."); see id. at
1086 (noting that the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp limited the relevance of unofficial records, such as "historical and statistical evidence to demonstrat[e] a specific discriminatory
intent").
53. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) ("For this claim to prevail,
McCleskey would have to prove that the Georgia Legislature enacted or maintained the
death penalty statute because of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect."); Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) ("In the present case, petitioner has not shown
that the Government prosecuted him because of his protest activities.").
54. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 17.
55. Id.; see also Foster, supra note 50, at 1086-93 (discussing incoherence of discriminatory intent analysis post-Feeney and explaining that the Court has alternately required
proof of specific government intent to discriminate and inferred discriminatory intent from
objective and circumstantial evidence); Kobick, supra note 31, at 529 (highlighting the
"doctrinal incoherence" of the post-Feeney discriminatory intent analysis).
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white community and adversely affected the black community. 56
In addition to presenting empirical evidence demonstrating the
discriminatory effect of the action, the plaintiffs also introduced
evidence at trial "in support of the contention that the community
activists (demanding closure of the street) were motivated by the
desire to limit black vehicular traffic through their neighborhood."5 7 The Court disregarded this "unofficial" evidence as irrelevant and focused its evidentiary inquiry solely on official City
Council hearing testimony and statements and resolutions by
City Council members when making their decision to close the
public street.5 8 Not surprisingly, this public record lacked any ex59
pression of racial animus, thus ending the inquiry for the Court.
This unwillingness to consider evidence outside the "official
record" betrays both the letter and the spirit of the Arlington
Heights six-factor test. On its face, these six factors contemplate a
broad inquiry into both official governmental processesdepartures from procedural and substantive sequences of legislative decision-making and the legislative and administrative history-as well as extra-governmental context, such as historical
background and pre-action sequence of events.6 0 For example,
Justice Marshall's dissent in Greene emphasized the larger historical and social context surrounding the City's decision, including Memphis's "unfortunate but very real history of racial segregation." 61 The majority's refusal to consider this larger "historical
background" or the "specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision," which included vocal demonstrations by ac56. 451 U.S. 100, 102 (1981).
57. Gayle Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 SUP. CT.
REV. 397, 432-33 (1983). "During the brief City Council hearing, residents of the area
north of Hein Park presented petitions with approximately 1,000 signatures protesting the
closing of West Drive, stating: 'This Closing symbolizes in unmistakable terms a White
neighborhood shutting its door on its adjacent Black and integrated communities." Greene,
51 U.S. at 143 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. Greene, 451 U.S. at 113-14, 116 (majority opinion) (ignoring statements by city
council members and protestors that the closure would protect "the neighborhood from
'undesirable' outside influences ... suggesting that ... the closure [was] motivated by the
racial attitude of the residents of Hein Park," and considering only the official City Council
statements that it was only "the 'undesirable' character of the traffic flow" with which the
government was concerned).
59. Id. at 126 (noting that the official records only included "legitimate" motivations
for the closure, including "[p]roper management of the flow of vehicular traffic ... and the
pedestrians' interest in safety").
60. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 269-70
(1977).
61. Greene, 451 U.S. at 144 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tivist voters demanding the resultant action for race-based reasons, ignores the second and third factors of the Arlington
Heights test and unjustifiably truncates the evidentiary inquiry. 62
Relying on Feeney and Greene, the Eighth Circuit likewise
turned a blind eye to damning extra-official evidence of discriminatory intent in Gray v. City of Valley Park.63 In Valley Park, the
plaintiffs sought to permanently enjoin enforcement of the City's
zoning ordinances regulating the presence and employment of illegal aliens. 64 Among other things, the ordinances penalized landlords who leased to illegal immigrants and employers who employed illegal immigrants. 65 Though facially neutral, the plaintiffs
presented compelling evidence that the ordinances were motivated by discriminatory animus toward Latinos. Plaintiffs submitted
evidence of the Mayor's statements in a local newspaper concerning the supposed necessity of the ordinances, including his statement: "You got one guy and his wife that settle down here, have a
couple kids, and before long you have Cousin Puerto Rico and Taco Whoever."66 Despite these damning statements, and despite evidence of the Mayor's pivotal role in passing the ordinances, the
court nevertheless rejected the equal protection challenge due to
a "lack of discussion [of discriminatory intent] during the meeting
at which the Ordinance was passed."67

62. Id. at 141-42, 141 n.5 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 252) (Official statements by the City Council are "not, as the majority implies, the only Arlington Heightstype evidence produced as trial. The testimony of city planning officials, for example,
strongly suggests that the city deviated from its usual procedures in deciding to close West
Drive.").
63. 567 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2009). The court affirmed the lower court's decision to disregard damning extra-official evidence of discriminatory intent. See Gray v. City of Valley
Park, No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238, at *83-84 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31,
2008).
64. Gray, 567 F.3d at 979-80 ("Generally, ordinance 1722 prohibits all business entities in Valley Park from knowingly employing unauthorized aliens.").
65. Id.; see Gray, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238, at *2 (discussing the "landlord provision" penalizing landlords from renting to undocumented immigrants); Martos, supra note
8, at 2118.
66. See Kristen Hinman, Valley Park to Mexican Immigrants: "Adios, Illegals!,"
RIVERFRONT TiMES (Feb. 28, 2007), http://www.riverfronttimes.com/stlouis/news/valleypark-to-mexican-immigrants-adios-illegals/content?mode=print&oid=2483315
(emphasis
added) (noting that the mayor admitted his lawyers advised); see also Lozano v. City of
Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 540-41 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
67. Gray, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238, at *81-84 ("In support of [their] assertion,
Plaintiffs point to evidence of comments made by the Mayor, and subsequently reported in
a local newspaper article, as well as materials circulated to the Board of Alderman prior to
the passage of the Ordinance .... However, [the] lack of discussion [at the Aldermen
meeting] forces the Court to look more directly at the terms of the Ordinance, and the tes-
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C. DiscriminatoryIntent Analysis and Religious Discrimination
Although Davis and its progeny considered Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause challenges to racial classifications, courts apply a similar analytical framework to First
Amendment Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause
challenges asserting impermissible religious discrimination. The
substantive standards for determining whether a First Amendment violation has occurred differs in some respects from a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge, but the evidentiary framework articulated in Arlington Heights for assessing
proof of a violation is largely the same.68 This approach to religious discrimination analysis makes sense, given the significant
overlap between the non-discrimination goals of the Equal Protection Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Free Exercise
Clause. 69
As with Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims, First
Amendment discrimination claims require proof of discriminatory
purpose, not just discriminatory impact. For example, in Employment Division v. Smith, two members of a Native American
religious sect whose rituals involved the use of peyote argued that
state laws criminalizing peyote violated their First Amendment
right to the free exercise of religion.7 0 The Supreme Court rejected
their claim on the ground that the peyote laws at issue had not
been passed for the purpose of impeding anyone's religious activity.71 While the law had that effect as applied to the challengers,
the Court explained that the law would only have been unconstitimony of the Aldermen in their depositions. The Ordinance itself provides the reason for
its passage, and each statement by the Aldermen support this purpose.").
68. See Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection
Clause: Why the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 1001-02
(2013) (discussing the changing nature of Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause
cases in relation to modem equal protection jurisprudence).
69. See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 728 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(emphasizing the centrality of the constitutional prohibition against religious discrimination: "Just as the government may not segregate people on account of their race, so too it
may not segregate on the basis of religion").
70. 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990) ('"This case requires us to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug,
and thus permits the State to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from
their jobs because of such religiously inspired use.").
71. Id. at 882-85 (finding that the law was not aimed specifically at a religious group
but applied to everyone in order to promote public safety and maintain the integrity of the
financial compensation fund).
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tutional if the state, in passing the law, had been motivated by
the purpose of interfering with religious practice. 72
A second area of jurisprudence where the Court has made use
of subjective evidence of improper motive is the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. 73 Unlike in the Free Exercise
Clause setting mentioned above, the Court has in several Establishment Clause rulings explicitly required that the government's
motive be either secular or, at the very least, not a desire to favor
some sects over others. 74 It is perhaps this subtle burden shifting
in Establishment Clause cases that explains why courts have appeared more willing to consider a wider range of "unofficial" evidence in the religious discrimination context.
For example, in Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court struck down an
Alabama law mandating a moment of silence at the beginning of
public school classes because the Court concluded, based in significant measure on historical evidence and legislative history, that
the law was a backdoor attempt to reintroduce prayer in
schools.7 5 In Jaffree, the Court conceded that a statute authorizing a moment of silence in public schools was facially neutral because it neither mentioned religion nor mandated students to do
anything in particular during the moment of silence.76 But the
Court also looked beyond the text of the statute to the legislative
history, where the "sole purpose reflected in the official history
[was] 'to return voluntary prayer to our public schools."'7 7 The

72. Id. at 877-79 (holding that such a "neutral law of general applicability" was constitutional, in contrast to "ban[ning] the casting of 'statutes that are to be used for worship
purposes"').

73. See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 728 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Just as the government
may not segregate people on account of their race, so too it may not segregate on the basis
of religion."); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532
(1993) ("In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated the principle that the
First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of
religion in general."); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1982) (holding that the
"clearest command" of the Establishment Clause is that the government may not act with
the discriminatory purpose to engage in "denominational preferen[tialism]").
74. See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (finding that a
policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at high school football games violated the Establishment Clause because it was enacted for the purpose of granting preferentialism to religion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (requiring the government,
when faced with an Establishment Clause challenge, to affirmatively establish that the
challenged action has a secular purpose).
75. 472 U.S. 38, 41-45, 60-61 (1985).
76. Id. at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("By mandating a moment of silence, a State
does not necessarily endorse any activity that might occur during the period.").
77. Id. at 77-78 ("Given this legislative history, it is not surprising that the State of
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Court also found dispositive candid testimony from Senator Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the first statute, who confirmed that
he had "no other purpose in mind" than "'to return voluntary
78
prayer' to the public schools."

While the Court "peeked behind the curtain" of the Alabama
statute in Jaffree, it nevertheless restricted itself to official legislative history and testimony. The Eleventh Circuit went further
in Glassroth v. Moore, considering pre-election, "unofficial" campaign statements as relevant evidence in finding that the chief
justice of the Alabama Supreme Court violated the Establishment
Clause when he directed the installment of a Ten Commandments monument in the state supreme court's rotunda. 79 The
Court considered pre-election campaign statements by Chief Justice Moore and literature released by Moore's campaign that he
was the "Ten Commandments Judge," as well as his statement
during the unveiling that "in order to establish justice, we must
invoke 'the favor and guidance of Almighty God."'8 0
Two years later, the Court invalidated a similar Ten Commandments display erected in the Kentucky statehouse, but
harshly criticized the practice of considering any evidence beyond
"the traditional external signs that show up in the 'text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,' or comparable official act." 81 To do otherwise would risk leading to an unprincipled
"judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter's heart of hearts." 82 At least
in the establishment of religion context, the Court explained that
an "objective observer" should only determine a government's
purpose by examining "openly available data supported [by] a
commonsense conclusion that a religious objective permeated the

Alabama conceded in the courts below that the purpose of the statute was to make prayer
part of daily classroom activity, and that both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
concluded that the law's purpose was to encourage religious activity.").
78. Id. at 56-57 (majority opinion).
79. 335 F.3d 1282, 1285, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003).
80. Id. at 1285-86. While the Court's consideration of such statements did indeed
reach beyond the four corners of the official government action, the Department of Justice
argued in its brief before the Fourth Circuit in InternationalRefugee that "Glassroth did
not involve a facially neutral policy, but an explicitly religious display-a massive Ten
Commandments monument-erected in the state supreme court's rotunda at the direction
of the chief justice." Brief for Appellants at 52, Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,
857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-1351).
81. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (quoting Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)).
82. Id.
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government's action." 83 "If someone in the government hides religious motive so well that" it does not appear in "the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute," then he has not
violated the Constitution because the government has not made
"a divisive announcement that in itself amounts to taking religious sides." 84

This McCreary evidentiary approach adheres in part to the Arlington Heights six-factor test in that it allows courts to look beyond the four corners of the government enactment.86 However,
the McCreary approach artificially forecloses judicial analysis of
evidence outside the official legislative history, which the Arlington Heights Court found vital to the analysis, such as the discriminatory effect of the action, the historical background, and any
departures from normal substantive standards. 86 As discussed below, however, even with this limitation, the McCreary analysis is
being challenged by judges and commentators who want to foreclose any motive analysis beyond the four corners of the government action.
D. Continued Resistance to Motive Analysis
Liberal resistance to discriminatory motive analysis generally
seeks a return to disparate impact analysis, and thus a return to
objective empirical reasoning and more successful civil rights litigation. But it is vocal conservative resistance to motive analysis
in the context of the executive order litigation that has garnered
significantly more attention in recent years. While some judges,
including Ninth Circuit Judge Jay Bybee, have suggested that review of the constitutionality of the executive order should be limited to the four corners of the document and that judges should
refrain from peeking "behind the curtain" of the order,8 7 this four
corners view is belied by the decades of settled case law confirming that motive matters in assessing First Amendment religious

83. Id. at 863.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 862; Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266-68 (1979).
86. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862; but see Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-67.
87. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting)
("[I]f we have questions about the basis for the President's ultimate findings," courts cannot "peek behind the curtain," even if it is to determine whether the executive order is a
'Muslim ban' or something else.").
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discrimination and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenges.88
Perhaps the most troubling and misguided expression of this
conservative sentiment was articulated by commentator Jeffrey
Toobin, who questioned the Ninth Circuit's consideration of
Trump's campaign statements, arguing that "[t]heir reliance on
such statements leads to a peculiar and unsettling possibility:
that an identical order would be upheld if Barack Obama had issued it, but that this one was invalidated because Trump was the
author."8 9
Toobin questioned whether it could really be the case that
Trump's executive orders are unconstitutional while the exact
same orders would be valid if they had been issued by President
Obama, who did not make any anti-Muslim statements. 90 If
Obama had issued orders like these and was motivated by antiMuslim prejudice, then his orders would have been just as unconstitutional as Trump's orders. "Indeed, [they would] have been
unconstitutional whether or not Obama had announced his prejudice publicly; what makes Trump's orders unconstitutional is his
motivation, not his statements, and his statements are significant
because they are evidence of his unconstitutional motive." 91 So, it
is not that the same action would have been constitutional if taken by Obama but unconstitutional if taken by Trump; it is that
the same action can be constitutional if taken for permissible
purposes but unconstitutional if the motive is discriminatory, and
Trump is a president who has declared his discriminatory motivation.

88. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866 & n.14 ("[T]he same government action may be
constitutional if taken in the first instance and unconstitutional if it has a sectarian heritage."); Books v. Elkhart Cty., 401 F.3d 857, 869 (7th Cir. 2005) (sustaining the Ten Commandments display as "secular ... in its purpose and effect"); ACLU of Tenn. v. Rutherford Cty., 209 F. Supp. 2d 799, 808-09 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (holding the same Ten
Commandments display to be unconstitutional based on the intent of the county commission decision to erect it, not the display itself); ACLU of Ky. v. Mercer Cty., 219 F. Supp.
2d 777, 787-89 (E.D. Ky. 2002) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to an identical Ten Commandments display and distinguishing itself on the ground that the County's
purpose had not been "tainted with any prior history").
89. Toobin, supra note 13.
90. Id. (suggesting this possibility confirms that campaign statements are inappropriate "evidence for judges to rely on in deciding the validity of Presidential orders").
91. Richard Primus, Motive Matters in Assessing the Travel Ban, TAKE CARE (Mar. 20,
2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/motive-matters-in-assessing-the-travel-ban.
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Toobin's argument willfully ignores the essence of discriminatory intent analysis. It has been the law of the land for more than
four decades that a facially neutral government action may nevertheless be unconstitutionally discriminatory if the intent behind
the action was driven by prejudice. 92 The intent of a facially neutral statute must, by definition, be derived outside the four corners of the statute itself. To say that "[t]he Muslim ban is either
constitutional or it's not" ignores what makes such statutes unconstitutional-the extra-statutory intent.93
Assessing the purpose behind an action is a common task for
courts. 9 4 "One consequence of taking account of the purpose un-

derlying past actions is that the same government action may be
constitutional if taken in the first instance and unconstitutional if
it has a sectarian heritage. This presents no incongruity, however, because purpose matters."9 5 Across all of these contexts, government action that would be constitutional if undertaken for
permissible motives is unconstitutional if undertaken for forbidden motives.9 6 Assessing the government's purposes in acting is,
accordingly, a routine and indispensable part of constitutional adjudication. And there can be no serious doubt that Trump's
statements about banning Muslims tell us something about why
these executive orders were issued. 97

92. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) ("A statute, otherwise neutral
on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race" and
must not have been enacted for a discriminatory purpose.).
93. Toobin, supra note 13, at 240. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 241 ("[T]he invidious quality
of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.").
94. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861 (2005).
95. Id. at 866 n.14.
96. See, e.g., ACLU of Ky. v. Mercer Cty., 219 F. Supp. 2d 777, 787-89 (E.D. Ky. 2002)
(illustrating that a government display found unconstitutional in one context was found
constitutional in another context because the purpose in the latter case had not been
"tainted with any prior history").
97. See Alana Abramson, What Trump Has Said About a Muslim Registry, ABC NEWS
(Nov. 18, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-muslim-registry/story?id=43639946
(documenting then-candidate Trump's numerous statements about a possible Muslim
tracking system, including the following answer to the question 'Is there going to be a database that tracks the Muslims here in this country?" as "Oh I would certainly implement
that. Absolutely"); Amy B. Wang, Trump Asked for a 'Muslim Ban,' Giuliani Says-and
Ordered a Commission to Do It 'Legally,' WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.washi
ngtonpost.cominews/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-a-muslim-ban-giuliani-says-an
d-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally/'utmterm=.db4Fefa574c6 ("So when [Trump) first
announced it, he said, 'Muslim ban.' He called me up. He said, 'Put a commission together.
Show me the right way to do it legally."' (alteration in original)); see also Faiza Patel, Yates
Letter Points to Evidence Showing Executive Order Unconstitutional,JUST SECURITY (Jan.
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But whether an action is constitutional often depends on the reason
why it was taken-the real reason, not the prettified reason that the
government pretextually offers in court to defend its action from constitutional attack ....
..
If the President's statements show, either alone or in combination with other evidence, that the executive orders were motivated
by anti-Muslim prejudice, then the government cannot save the orders by insisting officially that the motives behind them are benign.
If the Administration doesn't want its orders to be struck down, it
98
shouldn't act on the basis of discriminatory motives.

In short, where clear evidence of discriminatory motive exists,
it cannot be ignored.
E. Conclusion
Despite the facially broad evidentiary record theoretically
available to courts as articulated by the Arlington Heights sixfactor test, four decades of post-Arlington Heights jurisprudence
highlight a much more restrained approach taken by courts, one
which limits judicial inquiry of intent to official governmental
records such as official city council minutes or drafts of legislative
materials. For a variety of reasons, courts have been reluctant to
tread beyond these tangible, officially sanctioned documents to
look for discriminatory animus, even where a consistent and indisputable record of discriminatory statements from government
officials exists.
Indeed, courts consistently reject evidence that could satisfy
any one of the Arlington Heights factors, requiring instead explicit evidence of a perpetrator's subjective intent to discriminate.
The factors are broad and arguably encompass a wide range of
potentially probative evidence. In particular, factors (2) and (3)
appear to contemplate consideration of extra-official political
statements, including statements made by elected officials and
campaign statements by political candidates.

31, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/37053/yates-letter-points-evidence-showing-execu

tive-order-unconstitutionall ("According to Giuliani, he put together a 'commission,' which
came up with the idea of focusing on danger rather than religion; the ban was based 'on
places where there are [sic] substantial evidence that people are sending terrorists into
our country.' Of course, as many have pointed out, the countries affected by the ban have
hardly been a source of terrorist attacks in the United States."); id. (noting that the son of
then-National Security Advisor Michael Flynn praised the executive order the day after it
was signed in a tweet stating "#MuslimBan").

98.

Primus, supra note 91.
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This "process of identifying discriminatory intent involves an
oversimplified and narrow understanding of evidence."9 9 Why
have courts willingly considered the historical background of a
decision or the specific sequence of events preceding the decision
when they appear in the official legislative or administrative record but resisted the urge to consider historical background or specific sequence of events when such evidence appears in media interviews, electoral debates, or campaign stump speeches? As the
court in InternationalRefugee correctly observed, nothing prohibits courts from considering such extra-official evidence under Arlington Heights.10 0 The following section highlights the five primary arguments advanced against consideration of campaign
statements and explains why these arguments cannot survive
logical or precedential scrutiny.
II. THEY'LL "SAY ANYTHING TO GET ELECTED"10 1 : THE PECULIAR
CASE OF CAMPAIGN RHETORIC
As illustrated above, courts remain reluctant to invoke the second and third Arlington Heights factors to consider evidence of
discriminatory intent beyond the four corners of an official governmental record, even though no doctrinal restriction prevents
them from doing so. This section explores one such category of extra-official evidence-campaign statements-and examines the
primary arguments advanced by judges and scholars as to why
campaign statements should be inadmissible per se in the discriminatory intent analysis. Broadly speaking, these arguments
address two types of issues: (1) the evidentiary concern that campaign speech is insufficiently reliable, and (2) the normative

99. Martos, supra note 8, at 2102.
100. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 598-99 ("But we decline
to impose a bright-line rule against considering campaign statements, because as with any
evidence, we must make an individualized determination as to a statement's relevancy
and probative value in light of all the circumstances.").
101. Jim Swift, Cooper to Hillary: "Will You Say Anything to Get Elected?," WKLY.
STANDARD (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.weeklystandard.comlprint/cooper-to-hillary-will-you
-say-anything-to-get-electedlarticle/ 1045235 (recounting debate moderator Anderson
Cooper's summary of Hillary Clinton's politically expedient policy changes from campaign
to campaign); Raul A. Reyes, Trump Will Say Anything to Get Elected, CNN (June 29,
2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/28/opinions/trump-shifting-views-reyes/index.html
("Get out your Etch A Sketch-Donald Trump might be able to redraw another one of his
positions.").
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judgment that freedom of political speech and freedom of governments to enact laws are equally important ideals that are best
protected when left separable and distinct from one another.
A. Evidentiary Concerns: Lies, Slippery Slopes, and Straitjackets
Critics of "peeking behind the curtain" of official records to discern government intent via campaign statements raise several
distinct but related concerns that can fairly be characterized as
evidentiary in nature. These concerns focus on the relative unreliability of campaign statements to divine true motive. Unlike analyzing official government records, critics claim that attempting
to uncover subjective motivation by sifting through mountains of
campaign statements amounts to little more than untethered "judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter's heart of hearts." 102 In other
words, the evidence is inherently of little use and may even prove
prejudicial given its inherent unreliability.103
These reliability concerns underlie three basic arguments
against considering campaign speech. The first argument asserts
that campaign statements are inherently unreliable because they
are often informal and improvised, and because the true intent of
the speaker is to secure election by any means necessary. 104 The
second argument claims that a dangerous evidentiary slippery
slope lurks just beneath the consideration of campaign statements.10 5 If off-the-cuff statements of private citizen candidates

102. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) ("But scrutinizing purpose does make practical sense ... where an understanding of official objective emerges
from readily discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter's heart of
hearts. The eyes that look to purpose belong to an 'objective observer,' one who takes account of the traditional external signs that show up in the 'text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute' or comparable official act." (citations omitted)).
103. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (decrying reliance on campaign statements as "folly": "Candidates say many
things on the campaign trail; they are often contradictory or inflammatory"). Int'l Refugee,
857 F.3d at 649-50 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("Because of their nature, campaign statements are unbounded resources by which to find intent of various kinds. They are often
short-hand for larger ideas; they are explained, modified, retracted, and amplified as they
are repeated and as new circumstances and arguments arise.").
104. Eugene Kontorovich, The 9th Circuit's Dangerous and Unprecedented Use of
Campaign Statements to Block Presidential Policy, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/02/09/the-9th-circuits-dangero
(asserting
us-and-unprecedented-use-of-campaign-statements-to-block-presidential-policy/
that campaign statements have one explicit purpose-to secure election).
105. See Int'l Refugee, 857 F.3d at 650 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("If a court, dredging
through the myriad remarks of a campaign, fails to find material to produce the desired
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are fair game, then what prevents courts from considering statements made before the campaign? 106 The third argument questions whether a campaign statement, once ruled relevant to the
analysis, can ever lose its relevance. 107 In other words, can a politician who once uttered a discriminatory statement ever outrun
the effects of that statement for purposes of governing, or will
every official action taken from that point forward be tainted with
the whiff of unconstitutional motive?10 8
Each of these arguments articulate a concern on the pendulum
of evidentiary weight rather than an absolutist admissibility concern-that is, how relevant the speech is and not whether it is
relevant at all. Yet those advancing these arguments rely on
them to justify an absolutist, per se ban on the admissibility of
campaign rhetoric. This disconnect between holding and reasoning cannot be squared as a matter of law or logic. As with all traditional evidentiary analysis, the dividing line between when evidence of discriminatory intent should be admitted and when such
evidence is entitled to considerable weight by the fact finder is often difficult to discern. But while certain types of campaign
speech are certainly of less probative value than others, the following discussion highlights why this simple fact of evidentiary
weight does not and should not justify a bright-line admissibility
rule regarding campaign speech.
1. The De Minimis Probative Value of Campaign Rhetoric: The
"They're All Liars" Argument
As the title of this article and the introductory quote by Judge
Kozinski suggest, the first and most prominent argument adoutcome, what stops it from probing deeper to find statements from a previous campaign,
or from a previous business conference, or from college?").
106. See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1173 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Eager research assistants can discover much in the archives, and those findings will be dumped on
us with no sense of how to weigh them. . . . What is the appropriate place of an overzealous
senior thesis or a poorly selected yearbook quote?").
107. See Int'l Refugee, 857 F.3d at 650-51 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he unbounded
nature of the majority's new rule will leave the President and his Administration in a
clearly untenable position for future action. It is undeniable that President Trump will
need to engage in foreign policy regarding majority-Muslim nations, including those designated by the Order. And yet the majority now suggests that at least some of those future
actions might also be subject to the same challenges upheld today.").
108. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1174 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Even if a politician's past statements were utterly clear and consistent, using them to yield a specific
constitutional violation would suggest an absurd result-namely, that the policies of an
elected official can be forever held hostage by the unguarded declarations of a candidate.").
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vanced by judges and commentators against weighing campaign
statements as evidence of motive is that such statements are unreliable. This argument takes one of two forms. Some, such as legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin and Professor Katherine Shaw, claim
that campaign statements lack the formality and measured gravitas of official governmental records to be considered reliable. 109
Others, such as Judge Kozinski and Professor Eugene Kontorovich, claim.that such statements are poor indicators of a politician's true policy motives because they are designed primarily to
entice voters to vote for them.11 0 Put another way, politicians say
and do anything to get elected, so we should acknowledge that
fact and move on.
According to Toobin, courts willing to evaluate informal campaign statements are essentially "playing gotcha" with an elected
official by "accusing him of saying one thing in public while his
Administration was saying something else in court":
Candidates (and, to a lesser extent, Presidents) talk publicly all the
time. They say things off the cuff, improvising in the moment and
sometimes making foolish statements or outright mistakes.

. .

. In

contrast, a formal action by the President's Administration, in the
form of an executive order, is by definition a statement of concrete
policy, issued in contemplation of a legal challenge. These actions
111
should stand or fall on their own merits.

This view ignores the entire second step of the Arlington
Heights analysis-namely, that where direct evidence of discrimination is lacking, courts should analyze the "historical context,"
the "specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision," and any departures from procedural or substantive
norms. 112 By claiming that only a formal action, such as an execu-

109. Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: PresidentialSpeech in the Courts, 96
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=2981475 ("[I]t is a category error for a court to give legal effect to presidential statements whose goals are political storytelling, civic interpretation, persuasion
and mobilization-not the articulation of considered legal positions.'); Toobin, supra note
say things off the cuff, improvising in the moment and sometimes
13 ("Candidates ...
making foolish statements or outright mistakes.").
110. Kontorovich, supra note 104; Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1173 (Kozinski,
J., dissenting).
111. Toobin, supra note 13.
112. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 253, 260,
267 (1977); see Heidi Kitrosser, Is Speech from the Campaign Trail Relevant to Religious
Discrimination Claims?, ACS BLOG (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/sho
uld-elected-officials-be-held-accountable-in-court-for-campaign-speech ("[I]t is well established that courts may-indeed, often must-look beyond the face of a law to determine
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tive order or legislative enactment, contains the requisite formality for consideration, Toobin, Judge Bybee, and others seek to cut
the Arlington Heights discriminatory intent analysis off at the
knees, with the effect of invalidating only those actions with express discriminatory motives contained within the four corners of
the document. Such a restrictive view not only provides an open
invitation for prejudiced lawmakers to dress up discriminatory
laws as facially neutral, but also finds no support in post-Davis
precedent. 113
This formality argument also fails as a matter of logic, at least
with respect to unambiguous and consistent campaign speech.
These types of campaign statements "often provide a clear window to the candidate's true intent." 114 For example, in Decorte v.
Jordan, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a jury finding that a recently
elected Louisiana district attorney had unconstitutionally acted
with a racially discriminatory purpose when he replaced more
than fifty white employees almost exclusively with African Americans. 115 The district attorney formally advanced race-neutral
reasons for these decisions, but the court sensibly took into consideration his repeated public pledges during his campaign to
make his staff's "racial composition" more reflective of his parish's
population, which was overwhelmingly African American.11 6 Cen-

whether it is motivated partly by a discriminatory purpose.").
113. Toobin, supra note 13. Indeed, Toobin's invitation for executives to draft orders "in
contemplation of a legal challenge" is practically begging for a pretext. Id.; see also Segal,
supra note 4 ("So which is more probative of the President's true intent: his formal campaign promise, or briefs from lawyers given the unenviable task of laundering the President's intentions? The answer is obvious.").
114. Segal, supra note 4; see Kitrosser, supra note 112 ("To be sure, judicial inquiries
into alleged discriminatory purposes are highly context-sensitive.... [But] a long history
of public statements promising to take a particular action against a given group may well
convince a court that the promised action, once taken, does purposefully discriminate
against that group.").
115. 497 F.3d 433, 438-40 (5th Cir. 2007) ("The evidence showed that, within the first
72 days Jordan was in office, the racial composition of the DA's non-attorney staff changed
from 77 whites and 56 blacks to 27 whites and 130 blacks.. . . Of the 56 non-attorney employees Jordan terminated, 53 were white, one was Hispanic, and two were black. Plaintiffs' statistician testified that, according to his analyses: the probability that 53 out of 56
terminated employees would be white if the terminations were race-neutral was less than
one in 10,000; and the probability of the racial composition changing as it did in Jordan's
first 72 days, if the decisions had been made randomly, was less than one in one million.").
116. Id. at 436 (The court observed that, shortly after his election, Jordan's appointed
transition team "compiled a report of its recommendations for Jordan in his new position.
The report included a cultural-diversity report recommending, within 100 days of his taking office, Jordan's hiring a staff reflective of New Orleans' racial composition. This recommendation was based on a Jordan campaign promise.").
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tral to the court's decision was the fact that there existed a direct
connection between his actions and this discriminatory
"campaign promise.""'
Trump's executive orders' connection to a discriminatory campaign promise is even clearer. Then-candidate Trump's campaign
promises of a "Muslim ban" were far more formal, orchestrated,
and deliberative than the district attorney's promises in Decorte
v. Jordan. Contrary to Toobin's characterization of Trump's
pledges as "improvisations" and "utterances," then-candidate
Trump's "Muslim ban" proposal was formally rolled out as a policy position on his campaign's website, 118 in campaign literature, 119 in talking points with his surrogates, 120 and in a major
policy speech delivered via teleprompter on December 7, 2015,
when he called "for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can
figure out what the hell is going on."1 2 1 It stretches the imagination to conjure a more formal or explicitly discriminatory campaign promise.
In addition to attacking campaign speech as inherently too "informal," Judge Kozinski and others assert that all campaign

117. Id. at 441.
118. See Jose A. DelReal, Trump Campaign Staff Redirects, Then Restores, Mention of
Muslim Ban from Website, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/2016/11/10/trump-campaign-staff-deletes-mention-of-muslim-ban-fr
om-website/?utmterm=.8f5be6fe7755 ("President-elect Donald Trump's campaign staff
temporarily redirected the webpage detailing his controversial proposal to temporarily ban
Muslim immigration into the United States, one of the most divisive and controversial policy ideas of his campaign, but swiftly sought to restore it after reporter inquiries Thursday. The proposal is detailed on a page titled, 'Donald J. Trump statement on Preventing
Muslim Immigration."').
119. See Jill Colvin & Steve Peoples, Trump's First TVAd Spotlights Muslim Ban, PBS
(Jan. 4, 2016, 7:30 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/trump-debuts-first-tv-adfor-early-voting-states/ ("With the opening 2016 primary contest four weeks away, Trump
is spotlighting his plan to ban Muslims from entering the United States.").
120. Allegra Kirkland, Trump's Ever-MorphingMuslim Ban Is Getting More and More
Confusing, TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 28, 2016, 3:18 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.
com/news/trumps-morphing-muslim-ban.

121. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for 'Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering the United States, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-musli
mims-entering-the-united-states/?utm-term=.f1cedbfda5bO6 (The call was contained in a
formal "statement released by the campaign," which Trump read verbatim at a rally after
"[tihe crowd enthusiastically agreed that he should. 'Donald J. Trump is calling for a total
and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what the hell is going on,' he said, adding the word 'hell' for emphasis this time.").
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speech is inherently unreliable because all politicians invariably
lie to get elected, and thus no campaign rhetoric can reliably indicate any intent besides the intent to win the election. 122 Given
this self-interested motive, critics argue that courts should ignore
campaign statements because "campaign promises are often insincere, designed to appeal to voters. Indeed, they are explicitly
instrumental, and the goal is not policy outputs, but election." 123
In other words, politicians in campaign mode are expected to lie;
therefore, their statements cannot and should not be taken at
face value.
The stereotypical political candidate described here is the one
who will say anything to get elected, even if that means saying
one thing at 10:00 a.m., another thing at noon, and a third thing
at 6:00 p.m. In making his point about the "poor shlub[" just trying to get elected, Judge Kozinski repeated the apocryphal tale of
President Franklin Roosevelt giving one policy speech in the
countryside and the exact opposite policy speech in the city solely
for the purpose of securing election.1 24 Indeed, it is true there is
no shortage of candidates for office contradicting themselves over
the course of a campaign, just as there is no shortage of "dark
purpose" that can be found in a candidate's campaign rhetoric. 125
Kozinski's argument may rest on the "typical" case of a duplicitous politician, but the court can readily take into account and
discount where appropriate the evidentiary weight of contradictory statements of intent. 126 As with Toobin's formality argument,
Kozinski's veracity argument articulates a concern that is a mat-

122. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("No shortage of dark purpose can be found by sifting through the daily promises of a
drowning candidate, when in truth the poor shlub's only intention is to get elected."); Int'l
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 650 (4th Cir. 2017) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("Is there not the possibility that a candidate might have different intentions than
a President in office?").
123. Kontorovich, supranote 104.
124. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1173 & n.3 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1173; see Mark Murray, The Art of the Flip-Flop:Breaking Down the 2016
Reversals, MSNBC (July 22, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/art-flip-flopbreaking-down-2016-reversals-n396546 (summarizing the contradictory positions taken by
Republican presidential candidates during the 2016 primaries).
126. See Int'l Refugee, 857 F.3d at 598-99 (declining to impose a bright-line rule rejecting consideration of campaign statements because "we must make an individualized determination as to a statement's relevancy and probative value in light of all the circumstances," including the consistency or contradictory nature of the statements); Kitrosser,
supra note 112 ("[S]uch inconsistency itself is a factor that courts can and should consider
in sifting through all of the relevant evidence.").
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ter of degrees rather than absolutes, of evidentiary weight rather
than admissibility. In the adversarial litigation context, the two
sides will doubtlessly marshal evidence indicative of inconsistent,
ambiguous, or contradictory campaign pledges rendering such
statements of limited probative value in divining intent. Indeed,
we readily expect a candidate to "play to the base" and offer up
"red meat" campaign pledges to diehard supporters of her chosen
political party, only to soften her stance or even abandon those
more extreme promises as she strategically "plays to the middle"
in the general election. In this "typical" case, courts are more
than equipped to give such contradictory statements the appropriate weight.
In addition to sidestepping the routine nature of weighing contradictory evidence during litigation, what Kozinski's bright-line
rule ignores is the atypical case of a candidate who speaks his
mind and who candidly and consistently makes his discriminatory motives known. 127 For example, then-candidate Trump first
formally announced his call for a "Muslim ban" on December 7,
2015, before a single Republican caucus or primary had been
held. 128 He consistently reiterated his call for such a ban throughout the primary season and into the general election, pledging as
late as Election Day itself to implement an "extreme vetting"
travel ban premised on his original call to bar Muslims from entering the United States. 129
Courts should not be hamstrung from making sensible rulings
in such cases by a logically flawed admissibility rule. 130 Such a
127. See Intl Refugee, 857 F.3d at 600 ("Indeed, this case is unique not because we are
considering campaign statements, but because we have such directly relevant and probative statements of government purpose at all.").
128. See Abramson, supra note 97; Johnson, supra note 121; Patel, supra note 97;
Wang, supra note 97; see also David Jackson, Donald Trump's Call for Banning Muslims
from Entering U.S. Draws Condemnation, USA TODAY (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.usatod
76 9
ay.com/story/news/politics/elections/2015/12/07/donald-trump-muslims-united-states/
42932/.
129. See Johnson, supra note 121; Trump's PromisesBefore and After the Election, BBC
NEWS (Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us- canada-37982000.
130. See Int'l Refugee, 857 F.3d at 600-01 ("[C]ourts regularly evaluate decisionmakers'
statements that show their purpose for acting. . . . We therefore see nothing 'intractable'
about evaluating a statement's probative value based on the identity of the speaker and
how specifically the statement relates to the challenged government action."); Kitrosser,
supra note 112 ("The question, then, is whether there exists any good reason to exempt
presidential campaign statements from the realm of evidence that courts can consider in
cases alleging religious discrimination. The answer is that there is none. While a presidential candidate may make conflicting statements at different times and to different audiences, that is true of many other categories of written and oral communication.").
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rule not only contradicts the intent of the Arlington Heights sixfactor test, but also risks forcing courts to turn a blind eye to incontrovertible evidence of discriminatory intent. At that point,
courts reviewing the constitutionality of a facially neutral zoning
ordinance banning the presence of "illegal immigrants" would arbitrarily be forced to ignore a mayor's campaign statements that
his pivotal role in passing the ordinance was necessary lest,
"[y]ou g[e]t one guy and his wife that settle down here, have a
couple kids, and before long you have Cousin Puerto Rico and Taco Whoever moving in." 13 1 Likewise, courts reviewing the constitutionality of a facially neutral executive order banning immigration from seven Middle Eastern countries with Muslim
populations ranging from 71.4% to 99.7%1 32 -ostensibly to "prevent terrorism" despite the absence of historical evidence of nationals from these countries seeking to commit terror inside the
United States-would arbitrarily be forced to ignore the statements of the executive entering the order emphasizing his desire
to ban all Muslims from entering the United States.1 33
Judge Kozinski claims that considering Trump's campaign
statements would require "[w]eighing .. . imponderables [and]
precisely the kind of 'judicial psychoanalysis' that the Supreme
Court has told us to avoid." 134 But when campaign statements are
utterly clear, utterly consistent, and wrapped in the formality of a
major policy speech and position statement on a campaign website, "[s]uch explicit statements of a religious purpose are 'readily
discoverable fact[s]' that allow the Court to identify the purpose
of this government action without resort to 'judicial psychoanaly-

131. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 540-41 (M.D. Pa. 2007); see
also Hinman, supra note 66 (emphasis added).
132. Muslim Populations by Country: How Big Will Each Muslim Population Be by
2030?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/jan/
28/muslim-population-country-projection-2030 (summarizing data by Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life).
133. See Rebecca Hamilton, Why Trump's Selection of the Seven Countries Is Not the
Same as Obama's, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 31, 2017, 9:59 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org
/37041/trumps-selection-countries-obamas/ ("[N]ot one Syrian, Iraqi, Sudanese, or any
other national from a country of concern has killed anyone in a terrorist attack in the U.S.
going back to at least 9/11."); James C. Hathaway, Executive (Dis)orderand Refugees-The
Trump Policy's Blindness to InternationalLaw, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 1, 2017, 8:05 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/37113/executive-disorder-refugees-the-trump-policys-blind
ness-inter national-law (observing that there is "no rational connection between refugees
fleeing the seven listed countries and the threat of terrorism (or indeed any other threat)

134. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005)).
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sis."'135 Judge Kozinski may be correct that there exists "no case
anywhere" that "sweeps so widely in probing politicians for unconstitutional motives," but the absence of such a case does not
explain why such a case should never exist.136 Indeed, no rule exists to limit consideration of such consistently discriminatory extrinsic evidence. 137 Moreover, the notion that "[1]imiting the evidentiary universe to activities undertaken while crafting an
official policy makes for a manageable, sensible inquiry" 138 ignores just how insensible it would be to ignore the evidentiary
universe predating those activities in the current climate. Indeed,
as with many aspects of the Trump era, Trump's campaign
statements appear so unprecedented in their explicitly discriminatory nature (at least for the twenty-first century) that probing
them for unconstitutional motives seems not only necessary and
legally justifiable, but obvious.13 9 Defendants argue that because
they were made outside the formal governmental decisionmaking process or before President Trump became a government
official, they are inadmissible. 14 0

135. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 559 (D. Md. 2017)
(quoting McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862); cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971)
(asserting that searching for governmental purpose outside the operative terms of governmental action and official pronouncements is fraught with practical "pitfalls" and "hazards" that would make courts' task "extremely difficult").
136. See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1173 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The closest
analog may be the litigation involving another highly publicized controversial political figure-former Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore. Moore directed the installment of a massive statute of the Ten Commandments at the Supreme Court, which
the Eleventh Circuit found was impermissibly driven for a religious purpose as evidenced
by Chief Justice Moore's statement at the dedication ceremony that "in order to establish
justice, we must invoke 'the favor and guidance of Almighty God."' Glassroth v. Moore, 335
F.3d 1282, 1284, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003). See also id. at 1296 ("[N]o psychoanalysis or dissection is required here, where there is abundant evidence, including his own words, of the
Chief Justice's purpose.").
states that a
137. Int'l Refugee, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 560-61. ("Although McCreary ...
court considers 'the text, legislative history, and implementation' of an action and 'comparable' official acts, it did not purport to list the only materials appropriate for consideration. . . . Notably, in Green v. Haskell County Board of Commissioners[, [the Tenth Circuit] considered quotes from county commissioners that appeared in news reports in
finding that a Ten Commandments display violated the Establishment Clause.... Likewise, in Glassroth, [the Eleventh Circuit] found an Establishment Clause violation based
on a record that included the state chief justice's campaign materials, including billboards
and television commercials, proclaiming him to be the Ten Commandments Judge."').
138. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1173 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
139. See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 599-600 (4th Cir.
2017) (noting how remarkable it is that a clear evidentiary record of executive purpose exists from the President's own unambiguous words); Segal, supra note 4 ("Given the Trump
Administration's many anti-Muslim statements, it's hard to imagine how the ban could be
upheld by any court that gives serious weight to that evidence.").
140. Intl Refugee, 857 F.3d at 598.
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2. The Evidentiary Slippery Slope Argument
The second concern raised against analyzing campaign speech
can be fairly characterized as the "evidentiary slippery slope" argument. As Judge Kozinski rhetorically bemoaned, "[W]hy stop
with the campaign? Personal histories, public and private, can
become a scavenger hunt for statements that a clever lawyer can
characterize as proof of a -phobia or an -ism."1 4 1 When no brightline limits are placed on permissible evidence of intent, "eager research assistants" will deluge the courts with mountains of past
statements but will leave the court "with no sense of how to weigh
them." 142
These concerns are legitimate, but they again speak more to
evidentiary weight than admissibility. The fact that evidence may
be of limited probative value does not, by itself, caution against
its admissibility. Indeed, judges and juries are asked every day to
weigh competing evidence of varying probative value, discount
accordingly, and render decisions. 143 While divining an actor's
state of mind is difficult, whether it be scienter in a securities
fraud action or discriminatory intent in an equal protection challenge, the mere existence of a difficult fact-finding mission does
not mean that, as a matter of law, it should not be undertaken.
More to the point, judges are more than capable of discounting
evidence as less probative given the context within which the
statement was made, the time at which it was made relative to
the challenged governmental action, and whether the statement
preceded any suspicious or abnormal activity. 144 In fact, the Ar141. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1173 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
142. Id.; see also Int'l Refugee, 857 F.3d at 650 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("[O]pening
the door to the use of campaign statements to inform the text of later executive orders has
no rational limit. If a court, dredging through the myriad remarks of a campaign, fails to
find material to produce the desired outcome, what stops it from probing deeper to find
statements from a previous campaign, or from a previous business conference, or from college?").
143. Intl Refugee, 857 F.3d at 598 (observing that courts regularly rely "on principles of
common sense' . . . to cull the relevant context surrounding the challenged action," and
determine which proffered evidence is reliable and of sufficient probative value) (quoting
McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005)).
144. Id. at 598-99 ("The campaign statements here are probative of purpose because
they are closely related in time, attributable to the primary decisionmaker, and specific
and easily connected to the challenged action."); see also Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d
1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (reviewing an elected judge's campaign materials that proclaimed him the "Ten Commandment's Judge" as part of its inquiry into the constitutionality of a Ten Commandments display he installed); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
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lington Heights factors exist exactly for this purpose. Under Arlington Heights, a "historical background" and "specific sequence
of events" comprised of contemporaneous statements of animus
towards Muslims in the weeks preceding an executive order affecting almost exclusively Muslims would be more probative of intent than a "historical context" and "specific sequence of events"
consisting of racially and religiously discriminatory statements
made by the same elected official twenty-five years prior. 145
In short, Judge Kozinski's slippery slope argument overstates
the concern. No, judges should not consider any and all scandalous tidbits or "campaign skeletons" in a politician's closets as
equally relevant in the discriminatory intent analysis. 146 But
nothing suggests that any judge would. And to the extent a judge
finds he has "no sense of how to weigh" a set of campaign statements, the Arlington Heights factors exist precisely to ground the
analysis. 147 Courts should not be prevented from considering direct, incontrovertible campaign evidence of discriminatory intent
out of an unrealized fear that doing so will cause courts to open
the floodgates for all past statements. 148
The dissenting judges in Washington v. Trump and Int'l Refugee also warn that a judicial practice of searching for prohibited
motives in the things political candidates and government officials say to various public audiences will lead to an endless game
of gotcha, in which plaintiffs Google the statements of candidates
and officials in search of incautious remarks that can be used in
litigation.149 But this worry seems vastly exaggerated. Courts con-

Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-68 (1977) (In the equal protection context, "[w]hen
there is ] proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision," a court may consider "contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking
body.").
145. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267; Lydia O'Connor & Daniel Marans, Here
Are 16 Examples of Donald Trump Being Racist, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2017, 1:12
PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/president-donald-trump-racist-examples-us_5
84f2ccae4b0bd9c3dfe5566 (detailing first-person accounts from the 1990s in which Trump
regularly forced African American employees off the floor of his Atlantic City casino, disparaged these employees as "lazy," and claimed that "it's probably not [their] fault because
laziness is a trait in blacks. It really is, I believe that. It's not anything they can control.").
146. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1174 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 1173.
148. Cf. Brief for Appellants at 51, Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (11th Cir. 2017) (No.
17-15589) (questioning how courts will be able to "wrestle with intractable questions, including the level of generality at which a statement must be made, by whom, and how long
after its utterance the statement remains probative"); Kontorovich, supra note 104.
149. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1174 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("We'll quest
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fronting claims of discriminatory motive give the government the
benefit of the doubt: judges are not going to deem government actions unconstitutional just because something somebody said
might be interpreted as biased. Indeed, most courts considering
the weight of "extra-official" political statements have done so to
support the stated position of the government rather than undermine it. 150
Moreover, enacting any per se restriction against the type of
evidence a plaintiff alleging unconstitutional discriminatory purpose can marshal unfairly ignores the already nearinsurmountable burden these plaintiffs face. 15 1 Proving any mens
rea element is inherently a difficult task, one which is compounded when a plaintiff must attribute the most culpable state of
mind (intent) to guarded public officials. 152 And even if the plaintiff meets her evidentiary burden and proves discriminatory intent, the government may then present evidence that the challenged action was nonetheless necessary and narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling end. 153
Given the post-Davis reality that few constitutional challenges
based on an impermissible discriminatory purpose will ever survive because clear evidence of intent is so often lacking, courts

aimlessly for true intentions across a sea of insults and hyperbole. It will be (as it were) a
huge, total disaster."); Int'l Refugee, 857 F.3d at 650 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("The danger of the majority's new rule is that it will enable any court to justify its decision to strike
down any executive action with which it disagrees. It need only find one statement that
contradicts the stated reasons for a subsequent executive action and thereby pronounce
that reasons for the executive action are a pretext.").
150. See Shaw, supra note 109 (manuscript at 48) (noting that in cases considering the
importance of presidential speech on a challenged action, that "speech is used to support,
rather than to undermine, a president's position"); see, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 545 n.27 (1987).
151. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love" Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2189 (1996) (asserting that, in a post-Davis world, plaintiffs must
show "a state of mind akin to malice" to prove discriminatory intent).
152. See Primus, supra note 91 ("[I]t hardly seems fair to tell people who allege their
rights have been violated that they can show unconstitutional motives only on the basis of
what is contained within official policy announcements and not with evidence of what the
policymaking officials have said elsewhere. Even in this Administration, senior officials
implementing discriminatory policies usually know better than to write things like 'We are
intent on preventing Muslims from coming into the country' into the text of executive orders themselves.").
153. See Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002) ("Once a plaintiff establishes
a discriminatory purpose based on race, the decisionmaker must come forward and try to
show that the policy or rule at issue survives strict scrutiny, i.e., that it had a compelling
interest in using a race-based classification and this classification is narrowly tailored to
achieve that compelling interest.").

IS IT BAD TO BELIEVE A POLITICIAN?

2018]

307

should not further foreclose the possibility of using evidence in
the rare case where it exists in abundance. Indeed, "[w]hat is unusual about the present case is that Trump's statements were so
clearly biased and so brazenly made, so much so that giving him
the benefit of the doubt would amount to willful disregard of the
obvious."1 5 4 As the majority in InternationalRefugee opined:
Just as the reasonable observer's "world is not made brand new every morning," . .. nor are we able to awake without the vivid memory
of [Trump's] statements. We cannot shut our eyes to such evidence
when it stares us in the face, for "there's none so blind as they that
won't see." .

.

. If and when future courts are confronted with cam-

paign or other statements proffered as evidence of governmental
purpose, those courts must similarly determine, on a case-by-case
basis, whether such statements are probative evidence of govern155
mental purpose.

3. The Campaign Speech Straitjacket Argument
Finally, critics of reviewing campaign rhetoric to divine intent
worry that, "[e]ven if a politician's past statements were utterly
clear and consistent, using them to yield a specific constitutional
violation would suggest an absurd result-namely, that the policies of an elected official can be forever held hostage by the unguarded declarations of a candidate." 156 In other words, would
Trump be "automatically disbarred, from the moment of his inauguration, of exercising certain presidential powers, not because of
his actions as president, but because of who he is-that is, how he
1 57
won the presidency"?
In short, no. This concern, while legitimate, again seeks a per
se ban on all types of campaign evidence when the concern is one
154. Primus, supra note 91 ("Imagine, by analogy, that the police chief in Washington
v. Davis had said, on camera and in front of a large public audience, 'I want the Department to use a written test that weeds out black applicants as part of our promotions process.' . .. If the Chief had made that statement, it would obviously be relevant to the question whether the Department's motivation for giving the test were discriminatory."); see
Intl Refugee, 857 F.3d at 600 ("[T]his case is unique ... because we have such directly relevant and probative statements of government purpose at all.").
155. Intl Refugee, 857 F.3d at 599 (citations omitted).
156. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("If a court were to find that campaign skeletons prevented an official from pursuing
otherwise constitutional policies, what could he do to cure the defect? Could he stand up
and recant it all ('just kidding!') and try again? Or would we also need a court to police the
sincerity of that mea culpa-piercing into the public official's 'heart of hearts' to divine
whether he really changed his mind, just as the Supreme Court has warned us not to?").
157. Kontorovich, supra note 104.
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of degrees. As with all discriminatory intent cases, the passage of
time matters.1 58 Those statements made closer in time to the
challenged action will have inherently greater evidentiary weight
than older statements. Again, this maxim of evidence law is true
of all cases-not just equal protection challenges or cases involving campaign statements.
Moreover, intervening statements of contradictory intent or recantation of old discriminatory motives will, at a minimum, tend
towards a finding that any previously impermissible motivations
have disappeared.159 Indeed, in the case of the executive orders,
if the second enactment [was] adopted for pure rather than invidious
reasons, it is a qualitatively different enactment insofar as motive,
and the way the polity understands it, is an essential part of a law:
Justice Holmes once reminded that even a dog knows the difference
between being kicked and being tripped over. 160

As with any evidentiary analysis, there appears no reason why
older statements of intent should "stick" with a politician when
superseded by more contemporaneous evidence of contrary intent. 16 1 Similarly, when a series of campaign statements, made
repeatedly over time and immediately preceding enactment of a
challenged government action are consistently discriminatory,
that record should in fact "stick" with the politician. 162 In
McCreary, where the Court was reviewing a third attempt to create a courthouse display including the Ten Commandments after
two prior displays had been deemed unconstitutional, the Court
held that its review was not limited to the "latest news about the
last in a series of governmental actions" because "the world is not
made brand new every morning." 163 Indeed, "reasonable observers

.

158. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 269-70
(1977) (emphasizing the importance of the specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged action); Intl Refugee, 857 F.3d at 599 (discussing the importance of statements
made close in time to the challenged action); Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1286
(11th Cir. 2003) (considering statements made by Chief Justice Moore at the unveiling of
the Ten Commandments monument).
159. See Kitrosser, supra note 112 ("A stray bigoted statement by a legislator or executive is unlikely to persuade a court that a measure is discriminatory in the face of ample
evidence that it was directed toward, and serves a legitimate, non-discriminatory interest... . And such inconsistency itself is a factor that courts can and should consider. .
160. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 17.
161. See Segal, supra note 4.
162. See id.
163. See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850, 854-56, 866 (2005); see also
Jonathan Taylor, The World Is Not Made Brand New Every Morning, TAKE CARE (Mar. 20,
2017), https:// takecareblog.com/blog/the-world-is-not-made-brand-new-every-morning (cri-
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have reasonable memories," and to impose a limitation that factfinders can only consider the most recent public statement would
render a court "an absentminded objective observer, not one presumed to be familiar with the history of the government's actions
and competent to learn what history has to show." 164
The executive orders themselves prove the danger of such a
bright-line rule. While facially neutral, the overwhelming evidence points to a discriminatory motive by the Trump Administration to exclude at least some subset of Muslims from the
country on the basis of their religious affiliation. 165 This evidence
post-dates the campaign and extends well into the Trump presidency. 166 Have these consistent, unambiguous statements of intent really been supplanted by more recent statements by the
President's Justice Department articulating non-discriminatory,
post-hoc justifications for the executive orders in court filings?
Certainly not.
4. Conclusion
Courts and commentators are right to express concern about
the probative value of campaign statements in assessing discriminatory intent, at least relative to the probative value of official
legislative history, early document drafts, or other official governmental records. But a less than compelling piece of evidence is
not and should not be rendered inadmissible solely because it is
not the "best" possible evidence. Such a rule would upend basic
evidence rules and ignore the rare occasion where campaign
statements may shed just as much light on a politician's true motives as any carefully scrubbed official document.

tiquing Judge Kozinski's dissent in Washington v. Trump).
164. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 97, 121; Patel, supra note 97 ("When signing
the [executive order], Trump read out its title 'Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,' looked up and said 'We all know what [it] means. . . .').
166. See Daniel Burke, Trump Says US Will Prioritize Christian Refugees, CNN (Jan.
30, 2017, 11:28 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/trump-christian-refugees/
index.html (describing Trump's interview with the Christian Broadcasting Network hours
before signing the first executive order, in which he stated that the purpose of the order
was to prioritize Christian refugees who had been "horribly treated" in the seven designated countries); Jeremy Diamond, Trump Rails Against Court Ruling Blocking Travel
Ban, CNN (Mar. 15, 2017, 9:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/15/politics/donald-trump
-travel-ban-judge-ruling/index.html (quoting Trump's description of the second executive
order as a "watered-down version of the first order").
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B. Normative Arguments Against Campaign Rhetoric Intent
Analysis
Setting aside evidentiary concerns, at least three normative
arguments have been articulated against the use of campaign
rhetoric in discriminatory intent analysis irrespective of that
rhetoric's probative value. For this set of arguments, one may
concede that a given campaign statement might present persuasive evidence of discriminatory intent but nevertheless caution
against considering it in order to protect a more important legal
or policy principle. These arguments are considered below.
1. To "Take Care": The Oath of Office Transformation Argument
A central argument advanced by critics of considering campaign speech distinguishes between campaign speech and "elected official" speech to assert that candidates are private citizens
who have not yet taken an oath to "preserve, protect and defend
the Constitution," and therefore are not bound to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed." 167 Because statements by private persons cannot reveal "the government's ostensible object," 168 these private communications "cannot be attributed to
any government actor" to impute an improper purpose to government action. 169 Then-candidate Trump "was, in this sense, a
legally differently obligated person. His policies and their relation
to the Constitution would presumably be affected by his oaththat is why the Constitution requires it."170

167. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 8; id. art. 11, § 3; Kontorovich, supra note 104.
168. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860.
169. See Glassman v. Arlington Cty., 628 F.3d 140, 147 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002) (cautioning against use of statements made without the benefit of advice from an as-yet-unformed administration, and
which by definition cannot bind elected officials who later conclude that a different course
is warranted); Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1031 (10th Cir. 2008); Modrovich v. Allegheny Cty., 385 F.3d 397, 411-12 (3d Cir. 2004).
170. Kontorovich, supra note 104; see also Brief for Appellants at 51, Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-1351) ("Virtually all of the
President's statements on which the district court relied were made before he assumed
office-before he took the prescribed oath to 'preserve, protect and defend the Constitution'. Taking that oath marks a profound transition from private life to the Nation's highest public office, and manifests the singular responsibility and independent authority to
protect the welfare of the Nation that the Constitution necessarily reposes in the Office of
the President." (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (citation omitted))).
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This argument has some intuitive formalistic appeal. A private
citizen candidate does not yet have any formal obligation to protect the Constitution, and therefore cannot violate the Constitution in any formal decision-making capacity. But this argument
misses the point of discriminatory intent analysis. This analysis
considers not whether an official action, standing alone, violates
the Constitution, but whether the government official's intent
makes it so. Although no action taken by a private citizen candidate can violate the faithful execution clause of the Constitution,
the motives of a private citizen candidate can indeed inform the
analysis of whether that candidate's post-oath actions were impermissibly motivated by discriminatory motive.' 7 1
Notably, in Glassroth the Eleventh Circuit considered statements made by Chief Justice Moore before securing election to
that position, such as a campaign promise to install the Ten
Commandments in the state courthouse, as well as campaign materials issued by members of his campaign committee.1 72 Because
the state chief justice was the ultimate decision maker, and his
campaign committee's statements were fairly attributable to him,
such material was appropriately considered in assessing purpose
under the Establishment Clause.1 73 "Likewise, all of the public
statements at issue here are fairly attributable to President
Trump, the government decisionmaker for the Second Executive
Order, because they were made by President Trump himself,
whether during the campaign or as President . . . ."174
A bright-line rule distinguishing between the campaigning politician and the elected official also fails as a practical matter because "[e]lected officials are always at least in part in campaign
mode." 7 5 Indeed, a candidate campaigning for office "is often an

incumbent whose campaign and 'official' statements are inherent-

171. See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 561 (D. Md.
2017) ("Although statements must be fairly 'attributed to [a] government actor,' . . . Defendants have cited no authority concluding that a court assessing purpose under the Establishment Clause may consider only statements made by government employees at the
time that they were government employees. Simply because a decisionmaker made the
statements during a campaign does not wipe them from the 'reasonable memory' of a 'reasonable observer."') (first quoting Glassman, 628 F.3d at 147; then quoting McCreary, 545
U.S. at 866).
172. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003).
173. See id. at 1285, 1296; see also Glassman, 628 F.3d at 147.
174. Int'l Refugee, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 561.
175. Amar & Brownstein, supranote 17.
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ly intertwined."17 6 It would be impossible to articulate "a clear
rule about what evidence of invidious intent will be inadmissible
campaign rhetoric and what may be considered to be probative in
the adjudication of constitutional claims."1 77 At what point is a

sitting senator or President announcing official policy prescriptions and at what point is she wearing the robe of the "poor
shlub" just trying to get elected? 17 8 A bright-line rule based on an
unworkable distinction is neither good law nor good logic.
Moreover, a candidate's promises are relevant to inform the
electorate of her views of the Constitution generally and whether
she believes her policies are consistent with her obligation to
"faithfully execute" the laws specifically. In other words, a politician may sincerely believe a particular law or regulation is constitutionally permissible, only to be corrected by the coordinate judicial branch. The same may very well be true for a law or
regulation deemed impermissibly discriminatory. A politician,
whether candidate or elected official, may sincerely but incorrectly believe that the Constitution permits certain discriminatory
state action. In that case, the so-called oath of office transformation is irrelevant because the candidate-turned-elected official
maintained his discriminatory intent throughout and was later
informed that his motives were constitutionally impermissible.
2. The Freedom of Political Speech Argument
The direst warning against heading down the "evidentiary
snark hunt"1 79 of mining campaign records for discriminatory intent is that it "will chill campaign speech," presumably by curtailing candidates' freedom to say whatever they want without fear
of litigation reprisal upon taking office. 180 As the dissent argued
in InternationalRefugee:

176. Id. (A politician "has a dual audience; the government actors he is trying to influence to secure adoption of a regulation and the constituency who elected him whose support will be necessary if he is to stay in office.").
177. Id.
178. Indeed, increasing focus in the media on holding elected officials to account for
their campaign promises suggests campaign statements may be more "intertwined" with
the work of elected officials than ever before. Tracking Politicians'Promises, POLITIFACT,
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
179. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
180. Id.
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[Even considering campaign statements] would by itself chill political speech directed at voters seeking to make their election decision.
It is hard to imagine a greater or more direct chill on campaign
speech than the knowledge that any statement made may be used
later to succort the inference of some nefarious intent when official
181
actions are inevitably subjected to legal challenges.

Other courts have refused to consider campaign speech for
these exact reasons, in at least some circumstances. For example,
in Phelps v. Hamilton, the Tenth Circuit declined to consider a
district attorney's campaign statements to show that a prosecution commenced a few days after he took office was "bad faith or
harassment," because to do so would "chill political debate during
campaigns" and undermine the political process for selecting
prosecutors. 182
This argument merits consideration because our most basic
free speech principles have their "fullest and most urgent applica183
tion precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."
But the special nature of campaign speech does not make it "less
relevant than other presidential statements. If anything, the opposite is true."18
For example, critics of considering campaign statements assert
that such statements are intended to convey a message to voters
rather than articulate any particular legal policy. 185 But in the
First Amendment context, those messages make a legal difference. As Judge Derrick Watson explained in his decision enjoining the second executive order, the Establishment Clause prohibits government action that "sends a message" favoring one
religion over another. 186 Immediately following that decision,
President Trump confessed that he wanted to "go back to the first
[Executive Order] and go all the way." 187 "As messages go, [then-

/

181. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 651 (4th Cir. 2017) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
182. 59 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1995).
134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014)
183. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 572 U.S. _,
(quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)); see also Segal, supra note 4
("It's true that campaign statements deserve special consideration.").
184. Segal, supra note 4.
185. See Toobin, supra note 13; cf. Segal, supra note 4 ("[C]ampaign statements often
send the strongest messages to the public.").
186. Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1132, 1140 (D. Haw. 2017).
187. Bob Van Boris & Erik Larson, Trump on Travel Ban Ruling: "Go Back to the First
3 6
One," BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0 -1
trump-on-travel-ban-ruling-go-back-to-the-first-one.
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candidate] Trump's campaign pledge to ban Muslims, and his reaffirmation of that pledge as President, speak far more loudly
than any post-hoc memo claiming that the ban is really about national security."188

Moreover, "[t]o the extent that [judicial] review chills campaign
promises to condemn and exclude entire religious groups,

. .

. that

[is] a welcome restraint." 189 Put another way, the concern of judges and scholars about threats to democracy from chilling campaign speech seems backwards, because the true threat lies not in
discouraging politicians from making bigoted statements, but in
giving candidates "a free pass for discriminatory campaign
statements."1 9 0 If courts set a precedent allowing candidates to
make bigoted statements with impunity, the road will widen for
divisive politicians to ride a prejudiced wave to electoral victory
without facing consequences when they take prejudiced official
government action.
This problem is neither new nor unique to campaign speech,
but remains a central problem with Davis and its progeny. The
courts have signaled to government actors how to construct statutes and engage in action in a way that will avoid an equal protection problem. Even if a government official intends to harm a
racial group, she can act in a facially neutral manner and leave
few circumstantial indicators of impermissible intent. 191 Or, if a
legislature intends a disparate impact, it will make sure to write
a facially neutral statute and exclude any evidence of impermissible intent from the legislative history. So long as negative consequences of government action do not have obvious indicators of
subjective discriminatory intent, the government can explain a
188. Segal, supra note 4.
189. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 600 (4th Cir. 3017).
190. Segal, supranote 4 ("Far from chilling speech if we hold candidates to their words,
we should be concerned about facilitating discrimination by exempting entire categories of
political speech from ordinary methods of proving intent. That's because what is at stake
in the travel ban litigation is not just whether President Trump will be held accountable
for his past campaign statements, but also whether politicians in future campaigns will
have to worry that promising unconstitutional actions will come back to bite them in court
when, as public officials, they seek to make good on those promises.").
191. Primus, supra note 91 ("The rule that constitutionality depends on motive usually
favors the government in civil-liberties cases, because it is usually hard to prove that the
government has acted for bigoted reasons. For half a century, governmental actions with
clearly discriminatory motives have been rare-and in cases where the government's motive might indeed be discriminatory, it is typically hard to find proof, because most government officials know better than to go around saying This is a law targeted at
blacks/women /gays/Muslims."').
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harmful effect by reference to a different permissible purpose,
and any equal protection challenge is unlikely to prevail. 192
III. ARLINGTON HEIGHTS REDUX: EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS
FOR CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS

The Burger Court's shift from disparate impact to discriminatory intent in Davis simultaneously narrowed litigants' ability to
successfully challenge government action and broadened (at least
theoretically) the types of evidence litigants could present to
prove discriminatory purpose. Arlington Heights sought to place
principled limits on the scope of permissible evidence as reflected
in the six-factor test discussed above. 193 Notwithstanding courts'
reluctance to consider campaign statements as a part of this permissible evidentiary universe, such statements clearly fall within
at least three of Arlington Heights' six factors:
(1) The historical background of the decision: Statements made
by politicians regarding a proposed government action certainly
form an important part of the historical background of that action;
(2) The specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision: As the executive orders litigations demonstrate, campaign statements can prove critical in establishing a compelling
sequence of events leading up to the decision; and
(3) The legislative or administrative history of the decision:
While campaign statements per se are not part of the official legislative record, the blurred lines between an elected official acting
in an official capacity and an elected official perpetually in campaign mode make at least certain types of campaign statements
relevant to provide context for the official legislative or administrative history. 194
Beyond confirming the evidentiary relevance of campaign
speech as admissible to the discriminatory intent analysis as de-

192. Ian Samuel & Leah Litman, No Peeking? Korematsu and Judicial Credulity, TAKE
CARE (Mar. 22, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/no-peeking-korematsu-and-judicialcredulity ("In many ways, the travel-ban litigation is the easy case, because the statements of motive are staring everyone in the face . . . .").
193. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68
(1977).
194. See id.; see Amar & Brownstein, supra note 17.
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fined by Arlington Heights, this section highlights some specific,
objective considerations for courts to determine the probative value of this evidence. In particular, the size of the decision-making
body, the nature of the constitutional claim, and whether the action implicates separationof powers concerns bear heavily on the
analysis of whether and to what extent campaign statements reflect impermissible animus. 195 But, as with misguided attempts to
create a bright-line ban on consideration of campaign statements,
courts should interpret these objective factors flexibly and on a
case-by-case basis and resist the urge to create rigid standards
based on any of these three considerations.
A. The Size of the Decision-Making Body
Unsurprisingly, it is more difficult to establish the underlying
motives of ten county commissioners or one hundred senators
than it is of one mayor, governor, or President. Just as one individual actor may have mixed motives for taking a particular action, many individual actors likely present as many disparate motives as there are individuals responsible for the action itself.
This reality yields "[y]et another reason proffered for refraining
from motive analysis [as] the motive of many legislative bodies is
hard to discern-in Congress, there may be hundreds of motives
of hundreds of legislators in enacting a particular law." 196 As the
Court explained in Hunter v. Underwood, "the difficulties in determining the actual motivations" of a governing institutional
body increase substantially when a claim is brought against the
U.S. Congress as opposed to a county board of commissioners. 197
For example, the Court in United States v. O'Brien "downplayed the idea that an act of Congress could be struck down because of the intent of some legislators to enact it for the purpose
of suppressing protected speech." 198 In contrast, the Court found
195. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 17 ("In short, courts appear to weave their
way through many complex factors in evaluating claims based on invidious or impermissible motives. . . . [T]he nature of the constitutional claim, the size of the decision-making
body, and the persuasiveness of the extrinsic evidence of impermissible motive will all be
considered, with different factors controlling the Court's analysis in various cases.").
196. Id.
197. 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985).
198. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 17; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 38384 (1968) ("Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter.
When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit
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in Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle that a teacher could
assert a valid free speech claim challenging the school board's decision not to rehire him if the teacher could show the board was
punishing him for protected speech in which he had engaged. 199
The Court reasoned that the motivations of a small, insulated
school board would likely be much easier to determine than that
of a Congress divided into constituencies across the country. 200
But courts have not and should not apply this factor rigidly.
In Hunter, for instance, the Court struck down, on equal protection grounds, a provision of the 1901 Alabama Constitution denying the right to vote to any person convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude. 201 While facially neutral, the Court relied on the
historical background and legislative record to find that the allwhite state constitutional convention adopting the provision did
so with the intent of disenfranchising black residents in particular.2 0 2 The large size of the convention did not insulate it from an
equal protection challenge given the strength of the historical evidence establishing the invidious motivation of the convention
participants. 2 0 3
Likewise, uncovering the motive behind an executive actionwhich seemingly involves consideration of only one actor's "heart
of hearts"-may prove more difficult than it seems. Referring to
the executive orders litigations, Amar and Brownstein contend
that, because "the authority to issue an executive order rests with
one person alone, . . . struggling to determine the intent of a large
body is not a problem here." 2 0 4

to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility
of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to
void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of
what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to
make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact
it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork." (footnote omitted)).
199. 429 U.S. 274, 283-84, 287.
200. See id. at 280.
201. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223, 233.
202. Id. at 228-29.
203. Id. ("[Tlhe sort of difficulties of which the Court spoke in O'Brien do not obtain in
this case. Although understandably no 'eyewitnesses' to the 1901 proceedings testified,
testimony and opinions of historians were offered and received without objection. These
showed that the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901 was part of a movement that
swept the post-Reconstruction South to disenfranchise blacks.").
204. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 17.
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But is the President's motivation the only relevant one, even if
he is the ultimate decision maker? What about the motivations of
the advisors and cabinet officials involved in the development and
crafting of a policy enactment? Is it "worth nothing that the executive order blocked by the courts was jointly announced by the
Attorney General and the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, who asserted that its issuance was in the national interest
(and not intended to discriminate against Muslims)"? 2 0 5 Should

these opinions be considered in the discriminatory intent analysis? Yes and no.
Just as a campaign surrogate's brash statements may provide a
window into the true motivations of a more measured political
candidate, a subordinate government officer charged with crafting policy may also make statements indicative of the executive's
intent. Therefore, these statements may be considered relevant to
the analysis but ought to be discounted accordingly as inherently
less probative than statements from the decision maker himself.
But while statements of other closely connected non-decision
makers may be relevant to determining the decision maker's intent, it is important to note that the intent of these non-decision
makers remains irrelevant and ought not to be considered. In
other words, the benign (or not so benign) motivations of public
officials, such as Jeff Sessions or John Kelly, are not at all relevant to discerning the purpose of a presidential executive order,
because neither the Attorney General nor the Secretary of Homeland Security are authorized to issue a presidential executive order. Even if a plaintiff asserted that the President delegated all
authority for crafting a policy to a subordinate and merely adopted whatever action was proposed, such an argument still would
require a showing that the motivations of the subordinate officer
were synonymous with that of the executive.
B. The Nature of the ConstitutionalClaim
As discussed above, a court's analysis of governmental motive
may alter slightly depending on whether the constitutional challenge raises a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, a
First Amendment free exercise claim, or a First Amendment Es-

205. Toobin, supra note 13 ("In the absence of some extraordinary circumstances not
evident to me here, those views should be persuasive to a trial-court judge.").
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tablishment Clause claim. All three types of claims require some
showing of intent, but unlike equal protection and free exercise
claims, "the Court in several Establishment Clause rulings has
explicitly required that government's motive be either secular, or
at the very least not a desire to favor some sects over others."2 06
Indeed, there is probably "no area of constitutional law in which
direct inquiry into motive has been more accepted than equal protection jurisprudence adjudicating claims against invidious discrimination." 20 7
This doctrinal fact should have no bearing on whether to consider campaign speech as part of the discriminatory intent analysis. As discussed throughout, campaign speech should be considered anytime a motive forms an element of the constitutional
claim. But it should affect how such evidence is considered. The
subtle shift in burdens between Establishment Clause and Equal
Protection Clause challenges ought to also be reflected in how
courts consider and treat campaign speech connected to such
challenges. For example, if a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing an impermissible racial discriminatory motive under the
Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiff must also bear the burden
of establishing how certain pre-election statements prove such
motive. By contrast, if the government bears an affirmative responsibility to establish a secular motive for its action, it should
also bear the responsibility to rebut prima facie evidence of improper motive.
C. Deference and Separationof Powers Concerns
In addition to the nature of the constitutional claim, courts
should and do consider the nature of the governmental interest at
stake and whether those interests implicate separation of powers
concerns that, require courts to provide greater latitude for otherwise constitutionally suspect actions of the political branches.
Importantly, however, whether greater deference is owed to the
political branches in a particular case should not determine
whether campaign speech should be considered at all in the discriminatory intent analysis, but only whether such evidence is
sufficient to meet the appropriate legal standard.

206.
207.

Amar & Brownstein, supra note 17.
Id.
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For example, a government classification made on the basis of
race normally would automatically trigger strict scrutiny review
and require the government to demonstrate both a compelling
need for the action and that the action was the most narrowly tailored means of achieving that need. 208 Likewise, sufficient evidence of a racially discriminatory motive behind a facially neutral
law would trigger strict scrutiny review. 209
In the immigration context, however, courts have long deferred
to the actions of the political branches even where substantial evidence existed of racially or religiously discriminatory motive. 210
This doctrine of deference-known as "plenary power"-traces
back to the infamous Chinese Exclusion Case, in which the Court
upheld the exclusion of a Chinese national in accordance with an
act of Congress all but explicitly motivated by contempt for Chinese individuals. 211 In its decision, the Court upheld the exclusion
against a constitutional equal protection challenge, finding that
immigration decisions by the "legislative department" to exclude
aliens are "conclusive upon the judiciary." 212 According to the
Court, the propriety of immigration decisions and their impact on
foreign affairs with other countries "are not questions for judicial
determination. If there be any just ground of complaint on the
part of China, it must be made to the political department of our
government, which is alone competent to act upon the subject." 213
The Court has since held that the government must at least offer a "facially legitimate and bona fide" 214 reason for a challenged
immigration action and has indicated in dicta that the immigration power is "subject to important constitutional limitations." 215
But in reality, "the Supreme Court [has never] struck down an

208. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003).
209. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-70
(1977).
210. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Why Immigration'sPlenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68
OKLA. L. REV. 29, 30-31 (2015) (summarizing history of judicial deference in immigration
context); cf. Shawn E. Fields, The Unreviewable Executive? National Security and the Limits of Plenary Power, 84 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2, 4) (on file with
Tennessee Law Review) (asserting that the plenary power as once understood has eroded
considerably in the last twenty years).
211. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 589, 595-96 (1889).
212. Id. at 606.
213. Id. at 609.
214. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
215. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001).
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immigration classification, even ones based on race." 2 1 6 Indeed,

this doctrine of deference has led the Court to "uphold[] with depressing regularity statutes discriminating on the basis of race,
sexual orientation, political activity, and sex and birth out-ofwedlock" 2 17 that would never pass constitutional muster in a nonimmigration context.
With such a consistent history of deference, it is easy for one to
assume that "[t]he [C]ourt has given the political branches the
judicial equivalent of a blank check to regulate immigration as
they see fit." 2 18 The Trump Administration has advanced this absolutist position in its defense of the executive orders, asserting
that courts "[c]annot . ..

[r]eview the President's .

.

. Executive

Order[s]," precisely because "[t]here is . .. no basis for the Judiciary to second-guess the President's determinations" in the immigration context. 219
Relying on this history of deference, courts, commentators, and
the Department of Justice have all argued that campaign statements about a proposed immigration action are entirely irrelevant and should never be considered. In its brief before the
Fourth Circuit, the Department of Justice argued that thencandidate Trump's "Vluslim ban" statements were off limits because, "[p]robing the President's grounds for immigration policies
would thrust 'ill equipped' courts into the untenable position of
evaluating the 'adequacy' and 'authenticity' of the Executive's
reasons underlying its foreign-affairs and national-security judgments." 2 2 0 Likewise, Toobin asserts that campaign statements are

216. Peter J. Spiro, Trump's Anti-Muslim Ban Is Awful. And Constitutional., N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/opinion/trumps-anti-muslimplan-is-awful-and-constitutional.html.
217. Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 257 (2000) ("These decisions, and the statutes they upheld, are inconsistent with fundamental values reflected in domestic constitutional law, yet they continue
to constitute the foundation of immigration law.").
218. Spiro, supranote 216.
219. Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff State of Washington's Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order at 21-24, Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16012 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (Immigration decisions are areas "within the exclusive domain of the political branches of our government. . . . It is thus well-established
that courts cannot evaluate the President's national security and foreign affairs judgments, especially in the immigration context. . . . It is simply not possible for the Court
here to evaluate the President's Executive Order without passing judgment on the President's national security and foreign affairs determinations.").
220. Brief for Appellants at 45-46, Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d
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irrelevant in the immigration context because "Presidents should
be allowed to receive and accept advice to modify their views
without penalty from the courts .

.

. especially . .. when it comes

to matters of national security." 221 And in dissent, Judge Bybee
opined that consideration of campaign speech constitutes an impermissible "peek behind the curtain. So long as there is one 'facially legitimate and bona fide' reason for the President's actions,
our inquiry is at an end."2 22

These arguments miss the mark by conflating a court's invocation of a deferential standard of review with a court's right to
consider evidence to determine whether the government has met
this low standard. Over a century of immigration precedent appears to confirm that the government need only provide a "facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for an immigration action. 223
But campaign statements can illuminate whether such a facially
legitimate and bona fide reason actually exists. Any suggestion
that courts cannot consider evidence that a challenged action was
illegitimate, irrational, or arbitrary simply because the standard
of review is "facially legitimate" or "rational basis" lacks coherence. It is akin to arguing that no standard exists at all. 2 2 4
The majority in InternationalRefugee demonstrated the critical
role evidentiary campaign speech can play in probing for a ra-

554 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-1351) ("Under the Constitution's structure and its separation
of powers, courts evaluating a presidential policy directive should not second-guess the
President's stated purpose by looking beyond the policy's text and operation. The 'presumption of regularity' that attaches to all federal officials' actions . . . applies with the
utmost force to the President himself.").
221. Toobin, supra note 13.
222. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting) ("The Executive should not have to disclose its 'real' reasons for deeming nationals of
a particular country a special threat--or indeed for simply wishing to antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on that country's nationals-and even it if did disclose
them a court would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly unable to
assess their adequacy.").
223. See, e.g., id. at 1179-80.
224. See Samuel & Litman, supra note 192.
The Trump Administration says these cases mean the courts can never look
behind an immigration executive order. On this theory, the courts would have
to uphold the executive order even if Trump, upon signing it, had announced,
"I do this to make crystal clear that Christianity is America's official religion,
and that Islam has no place here." That cannot be right.
David Cole, Judges Shouldn't Ignore What We All Know Trump's Travel Ban Is Really
About, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/judges-sh
ouldnt-ignore-what-we-all-know-trumps-travel-ban-is-really-about/2017/03/22/4ad23ce2-Of
21-11e7-abO7-07d9f52f6b5_story.html?utm-term=.fdl3842e73fc.
I
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tional or facially legitimate motive. The majority noted the
Trump Administration had proffered a purportedly bona fide reason for the second executive order-national security. 225 But this
thinly defended reason was belied by the mountain of evidence
from the campaign trail, beyond confirming that this reason was
anything but bona fide, and that the real reason was anything
but legitimate. 226
The Trump Administration's attempt to "use magic words like
'national security' 2 2 7 to convert prejudicial motives into benign
justifications closely parallels the circumstances surrounding another infamous member of the "anticanon," Korematsu v. United
States.228 In upholding the conviction of an American of Japanese
descent for violating an exclusion order that required him to stay
in an internment camp, the Court accepted the government at its
word that internment was "deemed necessary because of the
presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members" residing in the camps. 229 The Court declined to consider the compelling
and damning evidence of racially discriminatory intent behind
the internment camps, instead concluding that it "could not re230
ject" this finding of "the military authorities."

225. Int'l Refugee, 857 F.3d at 572 ("The question for this Court, distilled to its essential form, is whether the Constitution ... protects Plaintiffs' right to challenge an Executive Order that in text speaks with vague words of national security, but in context drips
with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination.").
226. Id. at 575-76 (contrasting sworn statements of ten former national security experts that "[t]here is no national security purpose for a total ban on entry for aliens from
the [Designated Countries]" with the "backdrop of public statements by the President and
his advisors" over the course of the campaign concerning a "Muslim ban").
227. See Segal, supranote 4.
228. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011) (arguing that
infamous Supreme Court cases like Plessy v. Ferguson and Korematsu v. United States do
not "involve bad reasoning, nor are they morally repugnant.... I argue that anticanonical
cases achieve their status through historical happenstance"); see Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
229. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215-16, 218-19.
230. Id. at 219. In a meticulous dissent, Justice Frank Murphy peeked behind the curtain of this national security rationale and detailed overwhelming evidence of racial animus, including "questionable racial and sociological grounds" claiming the Japanese are
"given to 'emperor worshipping ceremonies,"' and statements by the commanding general
responsible for the Japanese evacuation of the West Coast that "I don't want any of them
here" because "[tihere is no way to determine their loyalty" and that the "danger of the
Japanese [is] espionage and sabotage." Id. at 236-39, 236 n.2 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see
also Samuel & Litman, supra note 192 ("But the real motivations for these conclusions,
Murphy could see, were not expert military judgments but naked racism. And he was able
to arrive at this conclusion by doing just what the no-peeking view objects to: looking behind the curtain of the proffered rationale for the exclusion order to see where it came
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Not surprisingly, in 2011, the United States filed a formal
"admission of error" acknowledging that the government had misled the Court by refusing to disclose intelligence reports undermining the stated "national security" rationale and other documents confirming the explicitly sectarian motives behind the
camps. 231 If nothing else, the shame of the Korematsu decision
should cause judges to think twice before rejecting out of hand
consideration of damning campaign statements in the name of
judicial deference.
CONCLUSION

Discerning intent is inherently difficult. In a post- Washington
v. Davis world, this difficult task falls to plaintiffs hoping to successfully challenge a racially or religiously discriminatory government action. It is "difficult to win cases requiring proof of discriminatory intent precisely because politicians are usually
circumspect when they have discriminatory views." 2 3 2 It is because of this deliberate obfuscation, and because "legislators and
administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous
competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the
merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality." 233
But "racial [and religious] discrimination is not just another
competing consideration. When there is proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified." 234 Given the high stakes of
permitting invidious government discrimination and the structurally high burden a plaintiff must meet to prove discrimination,
courts can and should follow the roadmap of Arlington Heights
and consider evidence of animus in its many forms-in the historical background of the action, the legislative history of the action,
from.").
231. Samuel & Litman, supra note 192; Confession of Error: The Solicitor General's
Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (May
20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opalblog/confession-error-solicitor-generals-mis
takes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases.
232. Richard L. Hasen, Does the FirstAmendment Protect Trump's Travel Ban?, SLATE
(Mar. 20, 2017, 9:28 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/
2017/03/the_9th-circuit-s-alex kozinskidefends-trump-s_travelban-onlfirst-amendme
nt.html.

233.
234.

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
Id. at 265-66.
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and the statements of the officials responsible for the action. This
includes pre-election campaign statements.
Those who claim broadly that no judge should "peek behind the
curtain" to determine intent ignore forty years of precedent.
Those who claim narrowly that campaign speech is somehow inherently defective and cannot reliably elucidate intent ignore a
court's inherent and most basic ability to weigh and discount,
where necessary, the probative value of such evidence. Worse,
those who seek a bright-line ban on consideration of campaign
speech fail to consider "the rare candidate who speaks his mind,
[who tells] us why he wanted to keep Muslims out of the U.S."235
And those who seek to ignore compelling and damning context of
animus because that animus has been "laundered" with the pretext of national security risk repeating the mistakes of the Supreme Court's darkest hour in Korematsu.
Politicians certainly do lie. But candidates also tend to keep
their promises. If a candidate invites voters to rely on divisive
and discriminatory campaign pledges in order to secure electoral
victory, he should not be surprised when litigants later rely on
those pledges to challenge his constitutionally suspect actions
once in office. "Candidates who make these statements are not
poor shlubs.' They are being held to account for what they say."2 36

235.
236.

Hasen, supra note 232.
Id.
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